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GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
Steven G. Davison * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Litigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Reponse, 
Compensation and Liability AcV (CERCLA), seeking to determine 
and apportion liability for the costs of a cleanup of a release or threat-
ened release of a hazardous substance, often involves the issue of 
whether federal, state, or local government is liable under CERCLA 
for part or all of the cleanup costs. In some CERCLA litigation, the 
federal government may be liable for cleanup costs because the re-
lease or threatened release occurred at a federal facility (such as a 
military base or a Department of Energy facility) where hazardous 
substances have been disposed of or leaked into the environment.2 
Liability of the federal government under CERCLA also may be at 
issue when a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance 
occurs at a privately owned factory or a facility that was manufactur-
ing a product or producing materials under a contract with the United 
States government.3 
A municipality may be sued under CERCLA for recovery of 
cleanup costs when the municipality's solid wastes, containing hazard-
ous substances from household, industrial, or commercial wastes, re-
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School 
of Law; B.S., 1968, Cornell University; J.D., 1971, Yale Law School. 
I Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 
1980,42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
2 See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994) (en 
banc) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). "Studies suggest that there are numerous [federal] govern-
ment facilities dangerous enough to fall within the ambit of CERCLA .... " [d. at 49. 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 808-10 (8th Cir. 1995); FMC 
Corp., 29 F.3d at 839-42. 
47 
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lease hazardous substances into the ground or groundwater at a mu-
nicipal or private sanitary landfill where the wastes were sent;4 or 
when another person illegally dumps hazardous substances at the 
municipality's sanitary landfill without the municipality's consent.5 
Both a state and the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) may be sued for recovery of cleanup costs when their cleanup 
activities under CERCLA or other governmental programs are con-
ducted negligently or otherwise improperly, causing the release of 
hazardous substances into the environment.6 
Under CERCLA, Congress has provided a mechanism for the fed-
eral and state governments and private parties to clean up a hazard-
ous waste site and to recover their cleanup costs from those persons 
(including federal, state, and local governments) responsible for the 
contamination of the site.7 "Congress enacted ... 'CERCLA' ... [in 
1980] in response to increasing concern over the severe environmental 
and public health effects from improper disposal of hazardous waste 
and other hazardous substances."8 Congress enacted CERCLA for 
the following two primary purposes: "First, Congress intended to 
provide the federal government with the means to effectively control 
the spread of hazardous .materials from inactive and abandoned waste 
disposal sites. . . . Second, it intended to affix the ultimate cost of 
cleaning up these disposal sites to the parties responsible for the 
contamination."9 
CERCLA furthers these purposes by providing EPA with author-
ity and funding "to take immediate cleanup action, without the need 
to await administrative and judicial determination of liability."lo This 
goal of immediate cleanup is accomplished in part through section 
10411 of CERCLA, which authorizes EPA, in coordination with state 
and local governments and persons responsible for the contamina-
tion, to clean up or otherwise respond12 to any release or threatened 
4 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1199 (2d Cir. 1992); New Jersey Dep't 
of Envtl. Protection v. Gloucester Envtl. Management Serv., 821 F. Supp. 999, 1~5 (D.N.J. 
1993). 
6 See Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chern., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 414-17 (E.D. Pa. 
1992); United States v. Western Processing, Co., 761 F. Supp. 725, 728-30 (W.D. Wash. 1991); 
Stilloe v. Almy Bros., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 95, 99--104 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (motion to dismiss originally 
denied but later granted in Stilloe v. Almy Bros., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1992». 
7 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7~ (1989). 
8 B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (D. Utah 1986). 
9 Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992). 
10 B.R. MacKay, 633 F. Supp. at 1293. 
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994). 
12 See B.R. MacKay, 633 F. Supp. at 1293 nA. 
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release of a "hazardous substance,"13 "pollutant or contaminant."14 In 
addition, section 10716 of CERCLA "establishes liability rules to allow 
the [federal and state] government[s] to recover [their] response 
costs under section 104 from responsible parties."16 
Section 107 authorizes the United States, a state, an Indian tribe, or 
a private person to bring suit against an owner or operator of a facility 
from which a hazardous substance is released or threatened to be 
released, a generator of a hazardous substance disposed of at such a 
facility, and certain other potentially responsible parties (PRPs), to 
recover both the costs of cleaning up hazardous substances released 
or threatened with release from the facility and damages for injuries 
to natural resources caused by a release.17 The federal government, 
state governments, and political subdivisions of the states can be 
PRPs liable for cleanup costs and damages to natural resources, both 
in suits brought under section 107 of CERCLA and in contribution 
actions brought by other PRPs under section 113(018 of CERCLA. 
However, as a result of the 1996 decision by the United States 
Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,19 private persons will no 
longer be able to sue state governments in federal courts to recover 
hazardous substance cleanup costs under either section 107 or section 
113(0 of CERCLA. This effect is due to the fact that Seminole Tribe 
overruled the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Pennsylvania v. Un-
ion Gas,2° and held that Congress does not have authority under its 
powers under Article I of the United States Constitution (which 
includes the power to regulate interstate commerce) to waive a state's 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution from suits by private persons in federal courtS.21 
13 Section 101(14) of CERCLA defines the tenn "hazardous substance" to include substances 
listed, designated or identified under certain other statutes as well as substances designated, 
pursuant to section 102. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9602; see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 
958 F.2d 1192, 1196 (2d Cir. 1992). Pursuant to section 101(14)(B), and under section 102 of 
CERCLA, the EPA has designated over 700 hazardous substances under CERCLA in Table 
302.4 of 40 C.F.R. § 302. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14)(B), 9602; 40 C.F.R. § 302 (1996). A substance 
is a "hazardous substance" under CERCLA if it is designated under any of the other statutes 
referred to in section 101(14) of CERCLA or under Table 302.4 of 40 C.F.R. § 302 regardless of 
the origin of the substance and the concentration or quantity of the substance. See B.F. Goo-
drich, 958 F.2d at 1200. 
14 Section 101 of CERCLA defines the tenn "pollutant or contaminant." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(33). 
15Id. § 9607. 
16 B.R. MacKay, 633 F. Supp. at 1293 (footnote omitted). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607; see also infra notes 145-54, 164-79 and accompanying text. 
18 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613(t); see also infra notes 155-u3 and accompanying text. 
19 Seminole Tribe of Fla. V. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1127---'J2 (1996). 
20 Pennsylvania V. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
21 See infra notes 11O---'J9 and accompanying text. 
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This Article analyzes the extent to which federal, state, and local 
governments are subject to liability as PRPs under CERCLA in suits 
brought under section 107 or section 113(f). It concludes that despite 
Seminole Tribe, states continue to be subject to suits in federal court 
brought under either section 107 or section 113(f) of CERCLA by the 
United States and other states, and the federal government and 
political subdivisions of states continue to be subject to liability as 
PRPs in suits brought by private persons under sections 107 and 
113(f). The liability of federal and state governments under sections 
107 and 113(f) as PRPs as a result of governmental regulatory activi-
ties, governmental cleanup activities, and governmental involvement 
with private business facilities also is analyzed in this Article. In 
agreement with the conclusions reached by most of the courts that 
have addressed these issues, this Article concludes that federal, 
state, and local governments should not be held liable under either 
section 107 or section 113(f) of CERCLA as PRPs solely as a result of 
governmental regulation of private business facilities, governmental 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, or governmental contractual in-
volvement with a private business facility manufacturing a product 
for, or providing materials to, the government. One conclusion 
reached in the analysis is that government entities should not be liable 
as PRPs even when cleanup activities are performed negligently or 
otherwise improperly and release hazardous substances into the en-
vironment; instead, a governmental entity that performs improper 
cleanup activities should not be able to recover cleanup costs that are 
not consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP)22 and should 
be subject to recoupment counterclaims filed by defendants in actions 
under section 107 or section 113(f) for damages to property caused by 
improper cleanup activities.23 
II. POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS UNDER CERCLA 
CERCLA imposes the costs of cleanup of hazardous waste sites on 
certain persons whom Congress determined should be responsible for 
the cleanup of the contamination. These persons (referred to as po-
tentially responsible parties, or PRPs) can be held liable under CER-
22 See infra notes 426-37 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 438-64 and accompanying text. 
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CLA for cleanup costs either in actions brought under section 10724 
by governmental entities or private citizens who have incurred re-
sponse costs, or in contribution actions brought by other PRPs under 
section 113(t).2fi 1\vo general terms, "persons" and "owners or opera-
tors," describe those who may be liable as PRPs under section 107 or 
section 113(t).26 Because the term "person" is defined to include fed-
eral, state, and local governments,27 and the term "owner or operator" 
is defined by reference to certain activities that a "person" may un-
dertake,28 federal, state, and local governments may be subject to 
liability under section 107 or section 113(t) when a governmental 
entity meets the standards for PRP liability.29 
A. Federal Government's Liability 
CERCLA to some extent has waived the United States' general 
sovereign immunity, which Congress has the power to waive if it 
expresses its intent to do so "unequivocally"30 on the face of a statute 
(without resort to legislative history).31 As originally enacted in 1980, 
CERCLA contained a section 107(g)32 that provided: 
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government shall 
be subject to, and comply with, this Act in the same manner and 
to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any 
nongovernmental entity, including liability under this section.33 
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994); see also infra notes 145-54, 164-79 and accompanying text. 
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0; see also infra notes 155...{j3 and accompanying text. 
26 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613(0; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
27 Section 101(21) of CERCLA defines the term "person" to mean "an individual, firm, corpo-
ration, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States 
Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a state, or any interstate 
body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). 
28 See id. § 9601 (20). 
29 See Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 7-13. 
30 See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,399 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1,4 
(1969). A waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity, however, is construed nar-
rowly in favor of the United States. See United States v. Idaho ex rel. Dir., Idaho Dep't of Water 
Resources, 508 U.S. 1, 7 (1993). 
31 See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992). 
32 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 
1980, § 107(g), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2783 (1980). 
33 This provision was interpreted as not waiving the United State's sovereign immunity (i) 
from suits seeking injunctive relief against alleged violations of CERCLA by EPA, see Jefferson 
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When Congress amended Title I of CERCLA with the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 198634 (SARA), section 
107(g) was amended to read: "For provisions relating to federal agen-
cies, see section 120 of this title,"35 and a new section 12Q36 was added 
to CERCLA, entitled "Federal facilities." Section 120(a)(1)37 now pro-
vides: 
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United 
States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter 
in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and 
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability 
under section 107 of this title. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to affect the liability of any person or entity under 
sections 106 and 107 of this title.38 
Because section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA is part of a section entitled 
"Federal facilities," section 120(a)(1) might be interpreted as only 
waiving the United States' sovereign immunity from liability for fed-
erally owned or operated facilities.89 In FMC Corp. v. United States 
Department of Commerce, four judges of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, dissenting from the opinion and judg-
ment of a majority of the en banc Third Circuit, argued that the 
federal government reasonably interpreted section 120(a)(1) of CER-
CLA as only making the federal government liable under section 107 
of CERCLA when the government owns or operates a facility where 
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance occurs.40 
County, Missouri v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 178, 181 (E.D. Mo. 1986); or (ll) from suits 
seeking a declaratory judgment that a defendant has not violated CERCLA, see United States 
v. Nicolet, 1986 WL 15017, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
34 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") Pub. L. No. 99-499,100 Stat. 
1666 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1994». 
351d. § 9607(g). 
361d. § 9620. 
371d. § 9620(a)(1). 
36 This section has been interpreted as waiving the United States' sovereign immunity for 
actions of the federal judiciary, but not as waiving the immunity from personal liability of federal 
judicial officers, and officers of the federal courts, for action in the performance of judicial 
functions. In re Sundance Corp., Inc., 149 B.R. 641, 660 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993). Consequently, 
CERCLA does not make federal judicial officers, or agents of the federal courts acting in an 
official capacity, personally liable under section 107 of CERCLA. ld. 
39 See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 1994) (en 
banc). 
40 See id. at 849 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). 
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Under this federal government interpretation of section 120(a)(1), the 
federal government would be subject 
to liability when it is acting or has acted like a "non-governmental 
entity," such as by owning facilities, but not when it is conducting 
a sovereign's purely regulatory actions in connection with the 
operations of a private, for-profit entity. Thus under the govern-
ment's analysis, its operation of facilities such as a federal park or 
an army base or naval vessel would subject it to "operator" or 
"owner" liability under CERCLA but its regulation of private 
parks or other private facilities would not, even if that regulation 
may result in the discharge of hazardous wastes.41 
The dissenters in FMC Corp. also argued that CERCLA's waiver of 
sovereign immunity under section 120(a)(1) does not extend to some 
regulatory activities, such as waging war, reserved exclusively to the 
federal government.42 
However, Judge Greenberg, for a majority of the en bane Third 
Circuit, held in FMC Corp. that "Section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA does 
not state that regulatory activities cannot form the basis of liability. 
Rather it states that the [federal] government is liable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as any non-governmental entity."43 
Judge Greenberg reasoned in FMC Corp. that Congress did not ex-
plicitly limit the scope of its waiver of sovereign immunity to federal 
facilities when it enacted section 120 in 1986, because section 
120(a)(1)'s reference to federal government entities being subject to 
''liability under section 107" ''was an exact counterpart to language in 
section 107 as originally enacted."44 Although he did not do so, Judge 
Greenberg also could have supported this reasoning by noting that 
section 107(g),46 as amended in 1986, refers to section 120 "for provi-
sions relating to federal agencies," not "for provisions relating to 
federal facilities." In FMC Corp., Judge Greenberg further reasoned: 
41 [d. at 847. 
42 See id. 
43 [d. at 840; The court in East Bay Municipal Utility District v. United States Department 
of Commerce found the Third Circuit's analysis in FMC Cmp. to be ''persuasive'' and concurred 
that federal government regulatory activities are not immune from liability under CERCLA. 
See East Bay Mun. Uti!. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 43 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1918, 1926 (D.D.C. 1996). The court in East Bay Municipal Utility District also held, as did 
FMC Cmp., that section 120 "actually covers the general applicability of CERCLA to the entire 
federal government .... " East Bay, 43 Env't Rep. Cas. (BN A) at 1926; see infra note 46 and 
accompanying text. 
44 F.M.C. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 9607(g) (1994). 
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Inasmuch as Congress did nothing in terms in 1986 to nalTOW its 
earlier waiver of sovereign immunity, it would be unreasonable 
for us to infer that it impliedly limited its original waiver by 
moving the waiver section. Indeed, if anything, through its enact-
ment of section 120, Congress reemphasized its intention that 
CERCLA be applied to the government. Overall, we think it is 
quite clear that the transfer of the waiver of sovereign immunity 
provision was nothing more than a logical reordering of the 
waiver provision accompanying the enactment of section 120. (We 
also point out that it would be difficult to understand why Con-
gress would have limited the waiver of sovereign immunity to 
activities at federally owned facilities .... Thus, the government 
itself does not treat the waiver of sovereign immunity as being 
limited to federal facilities.)46 
This holding by the majority of the en bane Third Circuit is a correct 
one, because it is clearly what section 120(a)(1) says on its face, and 
waivers of the United States' sovereign immunity are to be deter-
mined only by the language on the face of a statute.47 The ''Federal 
facilities" heading of section 120 should not be relied upon to limit the 
clear language on the face of section 120(a)(1); section 120 may have 
been entitled "Federal facilities" because most of the other subsec-
tions of section 120 specify CERCLA cleanup standards and proce-
dures for facilities and real property owned or operated by the United 
States. 
Under the interpretation of section 120(a)(1) followed by the ma-
jority of the en bane Third Circuit in FMC Corp., a court, in deciding 
whether the federal government is liable as a PRP under section 107, 
will consider both the federal government's regulatory activities and 
its non-regulatory activities with respect to a facility, and will deter-
mine whether the government's activities "taken in toto were of the 
type commonly associated with being" one of the four types of PRPs 
under section 107 and ''the type of activities in which private parties 
could engage."48 Although no court has held that governmental activi-
ties regulating actions of private persons are immune per se fromPRP 
liability under CERCLA, the courts uniformly have held, following a 
totality of circumstances approach similar to that applied in FMC 
Corp., that a governmental entity cannot be held liable as a PRP 
46 FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 842 & n.2. 
47 See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992) (stating that congressional 
waiver of United States' sovereign immunity must be clearly expressed on face of federal 
statute and cannot be implied from legislative history). 
46 FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 842. 
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under section 107 of CERCLA solely on the basis of governmental 
regulation of private business activities.49 
In support of this totality of circumstances approach, Judge Green-
berg reasoned in FMC Corp. that exempting the federal government 
altogether from CERCLA liability for regulatory activities would be 
inconsistent with the principle that "'CERCLA is a remedial statute 
which should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals,"'50 and with 
CERCLA's "'essential purpose of making those responsible for prob-
lems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and 
responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created."'51 
Judge Greenberg also argued in FMC Corp. that immunizing the 
federal government's regulatory activities from liability would under-
mine Congress' intent under CERCLA to ensure that those who 
benefit financially from a commercial activity should internalize the 
health and environmental costs of that activity into the cost of doing 
business,52 and to provide an incentive for the sound treatment and 
handling of hazardous substances.63 
In FMC Corp., Judge Greenberg further asserted that the court's 
refusal to recognize an exemption from CERCLA liability for federal 
government regulatory functions was consistent with section 107(b),54 
which he described as listing "the only three defenses ... available to 
any person, including the government,"55 from liability under section 
107. Judge Greenberg also argued in FMC Corp. that recognition of 
a principle of per se non-liability of the federal government would be 
inconsistent with section 107(d)(2),56 which exempts state and local 
governments from liability for "actions taken in response to an emer-
gency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous 
49 See infra notes 213---810 and accompanying text. 
60 FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 840 (quoting United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 
258 (3d Cir. 1992». 
61 [d. at 840 (quoting Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Thnolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 
(3d Cir. 1993» (internal quotation marks omitted by FMC Corp.). 
62 See id. at 840 (citing United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D. Md. 1991) and 
quoting United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chern., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 413 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 
1992». 
62 See id. at 840 (quoting 125 CONGo REC. 17989 (1979» (statement of Senator John S. Culver 
of Iowa), reprinted in 1 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510,148--49 (Comm. Print 1983). 
64 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994). 
66 FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 841. 
66 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2). 
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substance generated by or from a facility owned by another person."57 
Judge Greenberg reasoned that: 
Congress's creation of an exception for cleanup activities by state 
and local governments plainly shows that it intended to treat 
these activities differently from other government activities. Ac-
cordingly, CERCLA does not protect a government from liability 
simply because it acts in a regulatory capacity. Rather, a govern-
ment is protected under section l07(d)(2) because it is responding 
to an environmental emergency.58 
He also asserted that CERCLA's essential purpose of making respon-
sible parties bear the costs of remedying harmful conditions they 
created is not "served by making the government liable for attempt-
ing to clean up wastes created by others."59 He then stated, technically 
in dicta, that: 
[i]t stands to reason that inasmuch as state and local governments 
are immune from CERCLA liability for the consequences of 
cleanup activities in response to emergencies created by others, 
but not for the consequences of regulatory conduct in general, we 
should read this distinction as implied in the federal government's 
waiver of sovereign immunity as well.60 
In dissent in FMC Corp., Chief Judge Sloviter of the Third Circuit 
argued in response: 
Furthermore, the majority's implication of an exception for fed-
eral cleanup of hazardous materials from the waiver of sovereign 
immunity makes the statute's explicit exception for cleanup by 
state governments in section l07(d)(2) redundant because section 
lOl(20)(D) abrogates the states' sovereign, i.e. Eleventh Amend-
ment, immunity in language virtually identical to its waiver ofthe 
federal government's sovereign immunity.61 
67 Section 107(d) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d), is analyzed infra notes 86-108 and accom-
panying text. 
68 FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 841. 
69 Id. 
60 Id. (dictum). Judge Greenberg concluded, however, that the federal government's involve-
ment with the facility at issue in FMC Corp. was not in response to a threatened release of 
hazardous substances, and therefore concluded that the relevant question under CERCLA was 
whether the government's actions at the facility, whether or not characterized as actions in a 
regulatory capacity, were sufficient to impose liability upon the federal government under 
section 107 of CERCLA as one of the types of PRPs subject to liability under that section. [d. 
at 841-42. 
61 [d. at 848 n.2 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Section 101(20)(D) of CERCLA is analyzed later 
in this article. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text. 
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However, as discussed later in this article,62 most courts, agreeing 
with the majority position in FMC Corp., have held either that gov-
ernmental cleanup activities are immune from liability under CER-
CLA, or that such cleanup activities by themselves are not sufficient 
to make a governmental entity liable as a PRP under section 107 of 
CERCLA. Without making any distinction between governmental 
regulatory and cleanup activities and other governmental activities, 
the United States Supreme Court in 1989 stated in dictum that sec-· 
tion 120(a)(1) of CERCLA "is doubtless an 'unequivoca[l] ex-
Judge Greenberg, in an earlier opinion for the majority of a three-judge panel in FMC Corp. 
v. United States Department of Commerce (an opinion and judgment that were withdrawn and 
vacated when the Third Circuit granted en bane review in FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. 
of Commerce, 10 F.3d 987), also had held that the federal government's liability as a PRP under 
CERCLA should be determined by considering whether both the government's regulatory and 
non-regulatory activities "taken in toto were of the type commonly associated with being an 
operator or arranger under CERCLA and are the type of activities in which private parties 
could engage." FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 37 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1689, 
1695 (3d Cir. 1993). Judge Greenberg's opinion for the majority of the three-judge panel also 
had rejected the federal government's theory that the government is immune from liability 
under section 107 when it is acting as a sovereign in regulatory actions in connection with a 
private, profit-making facility and also held that the federal "government is liable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as any non-governmental agency." [d. at 1694. Judge Green-
berg's majority decision, however, also concluded that 
courts should consider both regulatory and non-regulatory activities as bases for 
liability and that the government should be immune only for regulatory activities that 
have no analogue to conduct of a private business .... Thus, where the government 
enacts regulations that do not have an environmental remedial purpose but instead are 
intended to further its commercial undertakings, it can be held liable under CERCLA. 
Similarly, if the government designs and constructs a landfill to run as a business it 
can be subject to section 120(a)(I). 
[d. He also reasoned in this subsequently vacated panel decision that determination of whether 
the government is liable as an "operator" of a facility under section 107 should be based not 
upon "the ultimate goal of the government regulation, but instead ... [upon] the short term 
goals of the regulation and the regulation's immediate effects and characteristics." [d. at 1695. 
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, Judge Greenberg's decision concluded that the 
federal government was liable under CERCLA as an "operator" during World War II of a 
privately owned industrial facility because 
the government was not issuing regulations for the purpose of taking remedial action 
or directly protecting the environment, uniquely governmental function .... It was 
imposing conditions to ensure its "contractual" rights in purchasing a custom-made 
product. Its motivation to do so was to protect its position as a buyer by ensuring that 
the specifications for the product were met. In short the government regulated in 
furtherance of its commercial goals. 
[d. at 1696. Judge Greenberg's emphasis on the relevance of the goals and purposes of govern-
mental regulation in determining governmental liability as an "operator," is absent from his 
subsequent majority decision for the en bane Third Circuit in FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't 
of Commerce, 10 F.3d 987 (3d Cir. 1993). 
62 See infra notes 360-425 and accompanying text. 
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press[ion]' of the Federal Government's waiver of its own sovereign 
immunity."63 A number of lower federal courts, relying upon section 
120(a)(1) and the inclusion of the United States within CERCLNs 
definition of "person," have held that Congress has waived the federal 
government's sovereign immunity under CERCLA and that the 
United States can be liable as a PRP under section 107 to the same 
extent as private parties.64 
These decisions correctly interpret the clearly expressed intent of 
Congress in section 120(a)(1). Congress intended to make the federal 
government liable under section 107 to the same extent that private 
parties are liable, with no per se exemptions from liability for govern-
mental regulatory activities, governmental cleanup activities re-
sponding to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances, 
or governmental contractual involvement with private businesses. 
However, as discussed later in this article, the federal government 
should not be held liable as a PRP under section 107 of CERCLA 
solely on the basis of governmental regulatory activities,66 govern-
mental involvement with a private business facility that is producing 
a product or materials for the government under a contract,66 or 
governmental cleanup activities responding to a release or threatened 
release of hazardous substances.67 
B. State Government Liability 
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,68 the United States Supreme Court 
held that Congress clearly has expressed its intent in CERCLA that 
"States be liable along with everyone else for cleanup costs recover-
able under CERCLA."69 The Supreme Court's reasoning in Union 
Gas, in support of this holding, was that Congress expressly included 
63 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). 
64 Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow Chern. Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3081, at *51 
(C.D. Cal. 1997); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1441 (E.D. Cal. 
1995); United States v. Moore, 703 F. Supp. 455, 459 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
65 See infra notes 213-310 and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 311-59 and accompanying text. 
67 See infra notes 360-425 and accompanying text. 
68 Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 1. 
69 Id. at 8. The Court also held in Union Gas Co. that Congress had the power under the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution to override a state's immunity, under the 
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, from suits by private parties in federal 
court, but this holding was overruled in 1996 in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida. Id. at 13-23; 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996); see infra notes 109-39 and 
accompanying text. 
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"State" within CERCLA's definition of "person"70 and that provisions 
of sections 101(20)(D)71 and 107(d)(2)72 of CERCLA, which exempt 
states from liability in certain circumstances, indicated that Congress 
intended states, unless exempted under these sections, to be subject 
to liability as PRPs under section 107.73 Specifically, the Supreme 
Court in Union Gas noted that section 101(20)(D), after stating that 
the term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of state or local 
government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily 
through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circum-
stances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue 
of its function as sovereign, explicitly states that this paragraph's 
[E]xclusion ... shall not apply to any State or local government 
which has caused or contributed to the release or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State 
or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this 
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both proce-
durally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, includ-
ing liability under section 9607 of this title.74 
In addition, the Court in Union Gas noted that section 107(d)(2) is 
"an explicit recognition of the potential liability of States" under 
CERCLA, because Congress would not have exempted states from 
liability under this section "unless they would otherwise be liable."76 
70 42 u.s.c. § 9601(21) (1994). 
71 [d. § 9601(20)(0). 
72 [d. § 9607(d)(2); see infra notes 1()2...{)8 and accompanying text. 
73 Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 7-10. 
74 [d. at 7-8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(0) (1994». 
76 [d. at 10. The court in Union Gas Co. also reasoned that Congress would not have provided 
that citizen suits could be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(I) "against any person (including 
the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permit-
ted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution)," unless suits against the States were 
elsewhere permitted, because "the reservation of States' rights under the Eleventh Amendment 
would be unnecessary if Congress had not elsewhere in the statute overridden the States' 
immunity from suit." [d. at 10 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(I) (1994». Finally, the majority noted 
in Union Gas Co. that section 101(20)(0) of CERCLA uses language "virtually identical" to the 
language Congress used in section 120(a)(I) of CERCLA (see supra notes 30-67 and accompa-
nying text) in unequivocally waiving the federal government's immunity from suits for damages 
under CERCLA; and reasoned that Congress, "[i]n choosing this mirroring language in section 
101(20)(0) ... must have intended to override the States' immunity from suit, just as it waived 
the Federal Government's immunity in section 120(a)(I)." [d. 
Justice Scalia, concurring in part in Union Gas Co., agreed with Justice Brennan's majority 
holding that CERCLA clearly makes states liable for money damages for cleanup costs in 
private suits. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy, dis-
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Consequently, states are subject to liability under sections 107 and 
113(f) to the same extent as private persons.76 
C. Local Government Liability 
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Union Gas in support of its 
holding that states can be held liable under CERCLA also supports 
a conclusion that local governments (including counties and munici-
palities) can be held liable as PRPs under sections 107 and 113(f). 
CERCLA's definition of the term "person"77 includes "municipality" 
and "political subdivision of a State" as well as a "State." Further-
more, the exemptions in sections 101(20)(D)78 and 107(d)(2),79 and the 
citizen suit provision in section 31O(a)(1)80 (the other sections relied 
upon by the Supreme Court in Union Gas), apply equally to state and 
local governments. Lower federal courts consequently have held that 
municipalities and other local governments can be subject to liability 
as PRPS,81 even for their disposal of municipal solid wastes (containing 
CERCLA hazardous substances) at a sanitary landfill.82 
sented in Union Gas Co. from Justice Brennan's majority holding that CERCLA makes States 
liable to suit by private parties in federal court, finding no "'unmistakably clear language' ... in 
either CERCLA or SARA that expresses Congress' intent to abrogate the State's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity." Id. at 45 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation 
omitted). 
76 The Supreme Court in Union Gas Co. rejected the state of Pennsylvania's argument that 
CERCLA made states liable only to the United States, but not to private entities or private 
citizens. Id. at 11-13. 
The term "state" within CERCLNs definition of "person" has been interpreted, however, to 
include only a unit of state government that is acting in an executive or proprietary activity. 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994); In re Sundance Corp., 149 RR. 641, 658 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993) 
(dictum). The term "state" within the meaning of CERCLNs definition of "person" does not 
include either a state's courts or a state's judiciary when they are acting in an official capacity, 
or a state court's officers (such as receivers) acting under the authority of judicial orders. 
Sundance Corp., 149 RR. at 658. Consequently, neither a state's judiciary (when acting in an 
official capacity), nor court officers such as receivers (when acting under the authority of judicial 
orders), can be liable under section 107 of CERCLA as either a person or an owner or operator 
of a facility. 
7742 U.S.C. § 9601(21). 
78Id. § 9601(20)(D). 
79Id. § 9607(d)(2). 
80 Id. § 9659(a)(l). 
81 See, e.g., RF. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1199 (2d Cir. 1992); New Jersey Dep't 
of Envtl. Protection and Energy v. Gloucester Envtl. Management Serv., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 999, 
1004"'{)5 (D.N.1. 1993); Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 155 RR. 890, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
B2 B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1206; New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection and Energy, 821 F. 
Supp. at 1008...{)9. 
l 
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Although federal, state, and local governments generally are sub-
ject to liability as PRPs under sections 107 and 113(0 to the same 
extent as private persons, several sections of CERCLA (which are 
discussed in the next section of this Article) exempt governmental 
entities from PRP liability in certain circumstances. Furthermore, as 
discussed later in this Article, the courts generally have held that 
federal, state, and local governments cannot be held liable as PRPs 
solely for actions involving the exercise of governmental regulatory 
powers,83 for governmental involvement with a private business facil-
ity producing a product or materials for government pursuant to a 
contract with the government or government regulations,84 or for 
governmental cleanup actions responding to releases or threatened 
releases of hazardous substances.85 
D. Exemptions of Governmental Entities from Liability Under 
Section 107(d) of CERCLA 
Sections 107(d)(1) and 107(d)(2)86 ofCERCLA exempt some federal, 
state, and local government cleanup activities from PRP liability.87 
These subsections, however, provide that governmental entities may 
be liable for costs or damages as a result of negligence, gross negli-
gence, or intentional misconduct, although, as discussed subsequently, 
it is unclear whether such liability is to be under CERCLA, state 
common law, or federal common law. 
EPA, in its Interim Municipal Settlement Policy takes the position that CERCLA does not 
exempt municipalities from PRP liability under section 107 for their disposal of municipal wastes 
at sites that release or threaten to release hazardous substances. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071 (1989); 
B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1205--00. However, EPA indicates in this municipal settlement policy 
that "EPA presently does not intend to pursue enforcement actions against municipalities 
generating or transporting municipal w~ste-regardless of whether hazardous substances are 
present-unless the total privately generated commercial hazardous substances are insig-
nificant compared to the municipal waste." B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1205 (citing 54 Fed. Reg. 
at 51,072 (1989». 
83 See infra notes 213-310 and accompanying text. 
84 See infra notes 311-59 and accompanying text. 
85 See infra notes 360-425 and accompanying text. 
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(d)(1)-(d)(2). 
87 In addition, section 104G)(3) provides that no federal, state, or local government agency 
shall be liable solely as a result of acquiring an interest in real estate under section 104G); and 
section 101(20)(D) excludes from CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator" a "unit of state 
or local government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax 
delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily ac-
quires title by virtue of its function as sovereign." 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(D), 9604G)(3); see supra 
notes 68-76 and accompanying text. 
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Section 107(d)(1) provides that except as provided in section 
107(d)(2), no "person" shall be liable under subchapter I of CERCLA 
(which includes sections 107 and 113(±)): 
for costs or damages as a result of actions taken or omitted in the 
course of rendering care, assistance, or advice in accordance with 
the National Contingency Plan (NCP) or at the direction of an on 
scene coordinator appointed under such plan, with respect to an 
incident creating a danger to public health or welfare or the 
environment as a result of any releases of a hazardous substance 
or the threat thereof. This paragraph shall not preclude liability 
for costs or damages as the result of negligence on the part of such 
person.88 
Because the term "person" is defined under CERCLA to include 
federal, state, and local governments,89 section 107(d)(1) applies to the 
federal government, to state governments,90 and to local governments 
as well as to private individuals and corporations. This exception from 
liability apparently could be raised as an affirmative defense by a 
government entity being sued under section 107 or section 113(f). 
Section 107(d)(1), however, only applies to cleanup actions that are 
both in accordance with the National Contingency Plan (or at the 
direction of an on-scene coordinator under such plan) and "with re-
spect to an incident creating a danger to public health or welfare or 
the environment as a result of any releases of a hazardous substance 
or the threat thereof."91 The implication of this latter requirement is 
that there may be cleanup response actions, in response to a release92 
88 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1). 
89 See id. § 9601(21). 
90 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1443 (E.D. Cal. 1995); 
United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239, 1246 (D. Md. 1991). 
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1). CERCLA classifies response actions as either removal actions 
or remedial actions. See id. § 9601(23}-(25); see also Kv'D Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 711 F. Supp. 784, 795 (D.N.J. 1989) (removal actions are designed for shorter term 
hazards); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (remedial 
actions are typically long term projects to effect permanent solutions). The NCP's requirements 
for remedial actions are greater than its requirements for removal actions. See Carlyle Piermont 
Corp. v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 742 F. Supp. 814, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
The National Contingency Plan, which was promulgated by EPA pursuant to section 105 of 
CERCLA is an EPA regulation that establishes procedures, standards, and responsibilities for 
response actions conducted under CERCLA by both federal and state governments and by 
private parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9605. The NCP, presently codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, was initially 
issued by EPA in 1982, and was revised in 1985 and 1990. The NCP is designed to assure that 
response actions under CERCLA are both cost-effective and environmentally sound. See Read-
ing Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 823 F. Supp. 1218, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
92 Subject to some exceptions, CERCLA generally defines the term "release" to mean "any 
l 
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or threatened release of a hazardous substance, which are in accord-
ance with the NCP but which are not exempted from liability under 
section l07(d)(1) because the incident did not create a danger to public 
health or the environment (even though there was a release or threat-
ened release).93 
Interpretation of section 107(d)(1) (and section 107(d)(2)) must take 
into account the admonition in section 107(d)(3) that section 107(d) 
"shall not alter the liability of any person covered by the provisions 
of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (a) of this section with 
respect to the release or threatened release concerned."94 Section 
107(d)(3) therefore prohibits a person who is a PRP under section 
l07(a) because of involvement with or responsibility for a release or 
threatened release of a hazardous substance, from being exempted 
from that liability under section 107(d). However, section 107(d)(3) 
should not be interpreted in a way that makes section 107(d)(1) or 
107(d)(2) meaningless. Sections 107(d)(1) and 107(d)(2) should be in-
terpreted as exempting cleanup activities that are in response to a 
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance,95 but as not 
exempting activities by PRPs that result in or cause the release or 
threatened release (for which section 107(d)(3) preserves liability). 
Courts disagree on whether the reservation of liability for negli-
gence in the last sentence of section l07(d)(1) is referring to statutory 
liability under CERCLA, tort liability under state common law, or 
liability under federal common law. This provision has been inter-
preted by one court as meaning that a person, who otherwise is within 
the scope of section 107(d)(1)'s exemption from CERCLA liability, can 
be liable in an action under section l07(d)(1) for the costs or damages 
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leach-
ing, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of 
barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollut-
ant or contaminant) .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). 
93 Cf Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642, 660-62 (D.D.C. 1996) (mere presence of 
hazardous wastes in the soil at a site does not establish an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment justifying issuance of an injunction under section 
7002(a)(I)(B) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(I)(B» (1994). 
94 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(3). 
95 United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239, 1246 (D. Md. 1991) (stating that "Section 
107(d)(1) expressly exempts all 'persons,' including the United States and states, from liability 
under CERCLA arising from actions taken in accordance with the NCP."); see also section 
107(d)(2),s exemption from liability for "actions in response to ... the release or threatened 
release . .. generated by or from a facility awned by another person." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(d)(2) 
(emphasis added); see infra notes 102, 107-08 and accompanying text. 
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that are the result of negligence by that person.96 However, because 
the last sentence of section l07(d)(1) does not refer to liability "under 
this subchapter" (as does the first sentence of the section), one court 
has observed that this last sentence of section l07(d)(1) could be 
interpreted as providing that persons otherwise within the scope of 
section 107(d)(1)'s exemption can be held liable only under state tort 
law for damages caused by their negligent cleanup activities.97 Several 
courts, implicitly following this interpretation, have concluded that 
section l07(d)(1) does not authorize litigation against the United 
States,98 "but merely clarifies Congress' intent that the CERCLA 
remedial scheme not be viewed as occupying the field to the exclusion 
oftort claims."99 These courts apparently were referring to tort claims 
under state common or statutory law,l°O although a third possible 
interpretation of the last sentence of section l07(d)(1) is that it is 
preserving claims for negligence under federal common law (not state 
common law) or under other federal statutory law such as the Federal 
Tort Claims Act.101 
Section 107(d)(1)'s exemption from liability is limited explicitly by 
section l07(d)(2), which states: 
No State or local government shall be liable under this subchapter 
for costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an 
emergency created by the release or threatened release of a haz-
ardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by an-
other person. This paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs 
96 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1447 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
97 See m. 
98 See United States v. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (E.D.N.C. 1991); United States v. 
Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. 725, 729 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
99 Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. at 729. 
100 See Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1447. 
101 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674-2680 (1994). However, claims alleging that the federal 
government improperly carried out response actions under CERCLA have been held not to be 
actionable under the FTCA because they fall within the FTCNs discretionary function excep-
tion in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). See United States v. Colbert, No. 87 Civ. 4789 (MGC) 1991 WL 
183376, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Skipper, 781 F. Supp. at 1113-15 (FTCNs discretionary 
function exception applies to Coast Guard response actions under Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1321, so FTCA cannot waive United States' sovereign immunity from a counterclaim under 
section 113(0 of CERCLA based upon claims alleging that Coast Guard improperly performed 
response actions). However, some courts that have not addressed the FTCNs discretionary 
function exception have permitted persons sued by the United States for response costs under 
section 107 of CERCLA to file counterclaims under the FTCA alleging that the United States' 
response actions were conducted improperly or injured or destroyed the defendant's property. 
See generally United States v. Shaner, No. Civ. A. 85-1372 1992 WL 154652 (E.D. Pa. 1992); 
United States v. Nicolet, No. Civ. A. 85-3060,1986 WL 15017 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
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or damages as a result of gross negligence or intentional miscon-
duct by the State or local government. For the purpose of the 
preceding sentence, reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct shall 
constitute gross negligence.102 
This exception from liability apparently could be raised as an affirma-
tive defense by a state or a local government being sued under section 
107 or section 113(0 of CERCLA.103 
One court has stated in dictum that "this exemption indicates that 
Congress intended to exclude from liability a state or local govern-
ment which responds to non-CERCLA public health and environ-
I mental nuisances,"l04 although section 107(d)(2) does not state explic-
itly on its face that its exemption does not apply to responses to an 
emergency that are undertaken under CERCLA. Section 107(d)(2), 
unlike section 107(d)(1), however, does not require a response action 
to be in accordance with CERCLA's National Contingency Plan or 
under the direction of an on-scene coordinator appointed under the 
NCP, but it does require that a cleanup action be in response to an 
"emergency" (a term which CERCLA does not define).105 Further-
more, a state or local government does not lose its exemption from 
liability under section 107(d)(2) because its "efforts proved to be less 
than entirely successful .... "106 
On its face, however, section 107(d)(2) does not exempt the federal 
government from CERCLA liability for emergency response actions; 
and, unlike section 107(d)(1) (which applies to both "actions taken" 
and "actions omitted"), section 107(d)(2) on its face only provides an 
exemption from liability for "actions taken" (but not for "actions 
omitted"), Furthermore, section 107(d)(2) on its face does not exempt 
state and local governments from CERCLA liability when they are 
100 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1994). The first clause of section 107(d)(I) states: "Except as pro-
vided in paragraph (2), no person shall be liable under this subchapter for .... " [d. § 9607(d)(I). 
103 Apparently because section 107(d)(2) is viewed as an affirmative defense to be raised by a 
state or local government that is sued under section 107 or section 113(t) of CERGLA, a plaintiff 
in an action brought under section 107 does not have to allege in his or her pleadings that no 
emergency existed, or that a state (or local) agency was grossly negligent, in order to state a 
claim against a state or local government under section 107. See United States v. Cordova Chern. 
Co., 59 F.3d 584, 591 (6th Cir. 1995). 
104 Lincoln v. Republic Ecology Corp., 765 F. Supp. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
106 Cf Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642, 647, 662 (D.D.C. 1996) (mere presence of 
hazardous wastes in the soil at a site does not establish an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment justifying issuance of an injunction under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(I)(B» (1994). 
106 See United States v. Cordova Chern. Co., 59 F.3d 584, 591 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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responding to a release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance generated by or from a facility owned by that governmental 
entity (even if the action is in response is to an emergency).107 As is 
the case with section 107(d)(1), section l07(d)(2) should be interpreted 
as exempting state and local government cleanup activities that are 
in response to a release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance, but as not exempting activities by PRPs that result in or 
cause the release or threatened release (for which section l07(d)(3) 
preserves liability).108 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL 
LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
Although Congress clearly intended to subject states to liability 
under sections 107 and 113(0 of CERCLA/o9 states now are immune, 
under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
from suits brought in federal courts by private parties under section 
107(a)(4)(B) or 113(f). This immunity is the result of the United States 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,110 which 
overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas. 111 
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides: "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, 
or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State."112 The literal text of 
the Eleventh Amendment restricts only suits against states in federal 
courts brought by citizens of other states or by citizens of other 
nations, and might further be interpreted "to restrict only the Article 
III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts .... "113 However, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment "confirms" the "presupposition" that a state is a sovereign entity 
in our federal system and that inherent in this sovereignty is a state's 
107 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1994). 
108 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Azrael, 765 F. 
Supp. 1239, 1246 (D. Md. 1991) (stating that "Section 107(d)(2) expressly exempts all states and 
local governments from liability as a result of actions taken in response to an emergency created 
by a threatened or actual release from a hazardous waste site owned by another"). 
109 See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text. 
110 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1118 (1996). 
III Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
112 U.S. CONST. amend XI. 
113 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. 
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immunity from being sued in federal courts by any private individual 
(including a state's own citizens).114 
Congress has been recognized, however, as having the power to 
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity if (1) 
Congress in the language in the text of a statute clearly expresses its 
intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immu-
nity, and (2) Congress in doing so has acted pursuant to a valid 
exercise of power under the United States Constitution.ll6 Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution has 
been held to authorize Congress to abrogate a state's immunity from 
suit under the Eleventh Amendment.116 In 1989, the Supreme Court 
held in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas that Congress had authority, 
when legislating under its powers under the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution, to override a state's Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity; and therefore that Congress had the power under the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution to make states 
subject to suits by private parties in federal court under section 107.117 
In 1996, Chief Justice Rehnquist overruled Union Gas in his 1996 
opinion for the court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.118 The Chief Justice 
reasoned in Seminole Tribe that Justice Brennan's rationale for this 
holding in Union Gas was that Congress' power under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution to abrogate a state's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit arose from the states' cession of their 
sovereignty when they gave Congress plenary power to regulate 
interstate commerce.119 In his opinion for the court in Seminole Tribe, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, however, that "a majority of the 
Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality" ex-
pressed in Justice Brennan's opinion in Union Gas.120 In Seminole 
Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "it was well established 
in 1989 when Union Gas was decided that the Eleventh Amendment 
stood for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity 
114 See id.; see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1890). 
116 See Seminole Tribe, 116 s. Ct. at 1123. 
116 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976); see also Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 
1125. 
117 See Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 19. 
118 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131--B2. 
119 See id. at 1126. 
120 See id. at 1128. In Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that in Union Gas 
Co., "Justice White added the fifth vote necessary to the result in that case, but wrote separately 
in order to express that he [did] not agree with much of [the plurality's] reasoning.'" [d. at 1125 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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limited the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III."121 He also 
agreed with the dissent in Union Gas that the Union Gas plurality's 
conclusion, that Congress under Article I of the United States Con-
stitution could expand the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction 
under Article III, "'contradict[ed] our unvarying approach to Article 
III as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal court 
jurisdiction"'l22 (except when Congress is acting under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution).l23 
When the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas, 
it relied upon what was characterized as "the well-established ration-
ale upon which the Court based the results of its earlier decisions" 
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution and state 
sovereign immunity in federal courtS.l24 Seminole Tribe held that 
"even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making 
authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents 
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against uncon-
senting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power 
under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the 
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."l26 
Although Congress clearly expressed its intent in CERCLA to 
waive the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits in fed-
eral courts by private parties,126 Congress acted under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution in making states liable under 
section 107,127 However, the provisions of sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 
113(f) that subject a state to suits brought by private citizens in 
federal district courts are not authorized by Congress' Commerce 
121Id. at 1127. 
122 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 39). 
123 See id. ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment . . . operated to alter the preexisting balance 
between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment."). 
124 Id. at 1129, 1131. The earlier decisions relied upon by Chief Justice Rehnquist were 
Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 
292 U.S. 313 (1934); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921); and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 
1 (1890). See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1129-30. 
126 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32 (citation omitted). Seminole Tribe consequently held 
that provisions of the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7), which author-
ize Indian tribes to bring suit in federal courts against a state in order to compel performance 
of duties imposed upon states by the Act, were not authorized by Congress' powers under the 
Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and violated a state's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suits by private persons in federal court. See id. at 1131~3. 
126 See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text. 
127 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 1Hi, 22 (1989). 
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Clause powers and violate a state's immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment of the Constitution.128 The Supreme Court's decision in 
Seminole Tribe precludes a private person from filing a suit against a 
state in federal district court under CERCLA, except for defensive 
CERCLA claims filed under the recoupment doctrine129 to reduce the 
state's recovery against that private person.130 
The Eleventh Amendment's immunity (and therefore its prohibi-
tion of suits brought by private parties under CERCLA) applies not 
only to suits that name a state as a party to the action, but also 
extends to suits brought against a state agency and other "arm[s] of 
the State."lSl However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit 
in federal court against a county, municipality, or other political sub-
division of a state.1S2 
The determination of whether a federal court suit brought by a 
private party against a governmental entity (including a bi-state en-
tity) is a permissible suit against a local governmental entity, or is a 
suit against a state that is barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the 
Constitution, is based upon a number of factors.l33 If those factors 
point in different directions, a court then will look at the Eleventh 
Amendment's twin rationales: (1) respecting state sovereignty-pro-
tecting the integrity and dignity of the state and (2) protecting the 
state's treasury from the risk of state liability. 1M "[T]he vulnerability 
128 Suits under sections 107 and 113(f) of CERCLA can be brought only in federal district 
courts because federal district courts are given exclusive original jurisdiction over such suits. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b)(I994). 
129 See infra notes 43~ and accompanying text. 
1110 United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 673, 678 (E.D. Cal. 1996). 
131 See Mancuso v. New York State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1996). 
182 See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). Because ''there is no tradition of immunity for municipal 
corporations" in federal courts and because state laws granting municipalities immunity from 
such do not control the application of federal law, municipal corporations are not immune under 
the United States Constitution from suits and liability under section 107. Owen v. City of 
Independence,445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 695 n.59 
(1978); see Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 155 B.R. 890, 896-97 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
133 See Mancuso, 86 F.3d at 293. These factors include: 
Id. 
(1) how the entity is referred to in the documents that created it; (2) how the governing 
members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is funded; (4) whether the 
entity's function is traditionally one of local or state government; (5) whether the state 
has a veto power over the entity's actions; and (6) whether the entity's obligations are 
binding upon the state. 
134 See id. at 293, 296. 
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of the State's purse is the most salient factor,"135 and if all the factors 
"are evenly balanced, this concern will control."136 
However, although the Eleventh Amendment makes states and 
"arms of the state" immune from suits in federal court brought by 
private persons, neither the Eleventh Amendment nor Article III of 
the United States Constitution bars the federal government from 
suing a state in federal court.137 Furthermore, the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not bar an action brought by one state against another 
state in federal court138 unless the plaintiff state is actually suing the 
other state as a trustee on behalf of individual citizens to obtain 
damages for those citizens for their individual claims.139 
IV. ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY SUBJECT A GOVERNMENT ENTITY TO 
PRP LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
Federal, state, and local governments generally are subject to li-
ability as PRPs under section 107 or section 113(f) of CERCLA to the 
same extent as private parties, although sections 101(20)(D),t40 
104(1)(3),141 107(d)(1),t42 and 107(d)(2)143 exempt governmental entities 
in certain circumstances from PRP liability. Furthermore, the Elev-
enth Amendment of the United States Constitution bars suits against 
states brought by private parties under CERCLA. 
When these exemptions from liability are not applicable, courts 
usually will determine the liability of a governmental entity as a PRP 
under the same standards that are applied to determine PRP liabil-
ity of private parties, by looking at the totality of the relevant circum-
stances. l44 However, courts have had difficulty in determining 
whether governmental entities should be held liable as PRPs on the 
135 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994). 
136 Mancuso, 86 F.3d at 293. 
137 See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 
U.S. 621,644-45 (1892). 
138 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59 n.12 (1972). 
139 See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1923); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 
108 U.S. 76, 90-91 (1883). 
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D)(1994); see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
141 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604G)(3); see supra note 88. 
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1); see supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text. 
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2); see supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. 
144 See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994) (en 
bane); Hassayampa Steering Comm. v. State of Arizona, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20,549,20,554 (D. Ariz. 1990); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 869 (D. 
Del. 1989). 
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basis of governmental regulatory activities, governmental involve-
ment with private business facilities producing products or material 
for the government pursuant to a contract or regulation, or govern-
mental cleanup of hazardous substances or wastes. After outlining 
CERCLA's scheme for liability of PRPs, this section of the Article 
analyzes the liability of governmental entities under CERCLA for 
these types of activities. 
A. Prima Facie Case of Liability Under Section 107 of CERCLA 
In a suit by the federal government or a state government under 
section l07(a)(4)(A)145 of CERCLA, a prima facie case of liability 
requires a showing of the following: there has been a release, or a 
threatened release which caused the incurrence of response costs, of 
a hazardous substance from a facility146 (or, in some situations, a ves-
seP47 or an incineration vessel)148 which caused the plaintiff to incur 
response costs, and the defendant is a responsible party within one 
or more of the categories of PRPs under section 107.149 In a suit by a 
private party under section 107(a)(4)(B),150 the majority of courts hold 
that a plaintiff's prima facie case requires a showing that the plaintiff's 
response costs were consistent with the National Contingency Plan,151 
as well as the elements of a prima facie case for a suit by federal or 
state government under section 107(a)(4)(A).152 
145 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
146 CERCLA defines the term "facility" to mean 
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any 
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impound-
ment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) 
any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, 
or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product 
in consumer use or any vessel. 
[d. § 9601(9). 
147 See id. § 9607(a)(1). 
148 See id. § 9607(a)(3), (a)(4). 
149 See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1989). 
150 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
151 See United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239, 1246 (D. Md. 1991). 
152 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992); County Line Inv. Co. 
v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 
1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989). But see Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1255-56 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(stating that consistency with NCP is not necessarily required in order to recover monitoring 
or investigative costs). A few courts, however, hold that a private plaintiff in an action under 
section 107(a)(4)(B) is required to prove that their response costs were consistent with the NCP 
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A person who is prima facie liable under section 107 may seek to 
avoid liability by establishing one of the defenses provided under 
section 107(b)163 (or, in the case of a governmental entity, one of the 
exemptions under sections 101(20)(D), 104(j)(3), 107(d)(1), or 
107(d)(2)). Furthermore, a person who is prima facie liable under 
section 107 for governmental or private response costs may have any 
damages reduced by the amount that such response costs were incon-
sistent with the NCP.l64 
B. Contribution Actions Against CERCLA PRPs 
A person who is liable or potentially liable as a PRP under section 
107 also can be held liable in a contribution action brought under 
section 113(f)(1).166 Section 113(f)(1) on its face authorizes "any per-
son" to bring a suit (which can be brought only in federal court)l66 to 
"seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially 
liable under [section 107(a)], during or following any civil action under 
[section 106] or under [section 107(a)]."167 Liability of the defendant 
under section 107 therefore is an element of a section 113(f)(1) contri-
bution claim.l68 
only in order to have damages awarded, not in order to establish a prima facie case for liability. 
See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989). 
"[T)he phrase in subparagraph (4) of Section 9607(a) [of CERCLA, 42 U .S.C. § 9607(a»), 'from 
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, 
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable' was apparently intended to modify each provision of 
subparagraphs (1)-(4)." Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Serv., Inc., 37 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1176, 1181 (E.D. Cal. 1993). 
Under this interpretation, a prima facie case for the federal or a state government or an 
Indian tribe to recover natural resources damages under section 107(a)(4)(c) and (f) of CERCLA 
would require a showing that there has been release of a hazardous substance from a facility 
(or, in some cases, a vessel or incineration vessel), and that the release caused injury to, 
destruction of, or loss of natural resources belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or apper-
taining to the plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(c) & (f). A prima facie case for the federal 
government under section 107(a)(4)(D) of CERCLA, to recover the costs of any health assess-
ment carried out under section l04(i) of CERCLA, would require a showing that there has been 
a release of a hazardous substance from a facility (or, in some cases, a vessel or incineration 
vessel), and that the federal government incurred the costs of a health assessment under section 
l04(i) of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(i), 9607(a)(4)(D). 
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). 
164 See infra notes 426-37 and accompanying text. 
166 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
156 See id. § 9613(b). 
167 Id. § 9613(f)(1). 
168 See United States v. Shaner, No. 85-1372, 1992 WL 154652, at "'4 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 15, 1992). 
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While section 113(0(1) clearly authorizes "any person" to seek con-
tribution from a PRP, as discussed below, federal courts disagree as 
to whether a person who is a PRP can recover hazardous substance 
cleanup costs from another PRP(s) in an action under section 107. 
Some courts have held that a person who is a PRP can recover some 
or all of its hazardous substance cleanup costs from another PRP only 
in a contribution action under section 113(0(1) and cannot bring a suit 
under section 107 to recover cleanup costs from other PRPS.159 Other 
courts, however, allow a person who is a PRP to recover part or all 
of its cleanup costs from other PRPs either in a suit under section 
113(0 or in a suit under section 107 (at least when the plaintiff is not 
seeking through the suit under section 107 to circumvent contribution 
protection granted by the government to another party under section 
113(0(2)160 or to avoid the shorter statute of limitations161 for contri-
bution actions).I62 
A court in a section 113(0 contribution action may equitably appor-
tion liability for recoverable response costs (and probably also for 
natural resources damages) "among liable parties using such equita-
ble factors as the court determines are appropriate."I63 A person who 
is liable as a PRP therefore can be held liable for response costs or 
natural resources damages either in a direct action under section 107 
or in a contribution action brought by another PRP(s) under section 
113(0(1). However, a PRP in turn can bring its own contribution 
action under section 113(0(1) against other PRPs to have other PRPs 
pay a portion of the response costs and natural resources damages for 
"Section 113(£)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(£)(1), authorizes contribution actions only against liable or 
potentially liable parties, i.e., parties who are owners, [operators], generators or transporters 
within the meaning ofCERCLA section 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)." United States 
v. American Color & Chern. Corp., 858 F. Supp. 445, 450 (M.D. Pa. 1994). 
169 See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 920 F. Supp. 991, 994-95 (E.D. 
Ark. 1996); City of Fresno v. NL Indus., Inc., No. CV-F 93-5091 RECIDLB, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15534, at *15-*19 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 13, 1995) (surveying contribution action cases). 
160 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(£)(2). 
161 See id. § 9613(d). 
162 See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmount Mining Corp., 42 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1755, 1761-£3 
(D. Ariz. 1996); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessener and Lake Erie R.R. Co., 921 F. Supp. 336, 
346-48 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
163 42 U.S.C. § 9613(£)(1). See Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCD, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 
507 (7th Cir. 1992); Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chern. Co., No. 83-7996 MRP (Bx), 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3081, at *57-*60, 76-79, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 1997), Cadillac Fairview/Cali-
fornia, Inc. v. Dow Chern. Co., No. 83-8034 MRP (Bx), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3083, *43-*50 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 1997). 
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which the plaintiff PRP has been held liable (or is potentially liable) 
under section 107. 
C. Damages for Which PRPs Are Liable 
A person who is a PRP under section 107 of CERCLA is both 
strictly liablel64 and jointly and severally liable (when there is indivis-
ible harm)l66 for: 
(1) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United 
States Government, a state,l66 or an Indian tribe, not inconsistent with 
the National Contingency Plan;l67 
(2) any other necessary costsl68 of response incurred by any other 
personl69 consistent with the National Contingency Plan;170 
(3) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, de-
struction, or loss resulting from such a release;171 
164 See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988). 
166 See Matter of Bell Petroleum Serv., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 902-04 (5th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721-23 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum 
Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 267-70 (3d Cir. 1992); Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-73. 
166 A statewide agency has been held to be within CERCLA's definition of a "state" under this 
provision. See Washington State Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co. Pacificorp, 59 
F.3d 793, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1995). However, a county airport commission created under state law 
has been held not to be a "state" for purposes of this provision. See Johnson Co. Airport Comm'n 
v. Parsonitt Co., 916 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 (D. Kan. 1996). Furthermore, most courts have held 
that a municipality is not a "state" for purposes of this provision. See City of Health, Ohio v. 
Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Thwn of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 
F. Supp. 469, 475 (D. Mass. 1991); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484, 
1488-89 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
167 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1994). See infra notes 426--37 and accompanying text. 
166 "Th show that any response costs were necessary under the CERCLA, the plaintiff must 
show '(I) that the costs [were] incurred in response to a threat to human health or the 
environment and (2) that the costs were necessary to address that threat.''' Foster v. United 
States, 922 F. Supp. 642, 652 (D.D.C. 1996) (quoting G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 854 F. 
Supp. 539, 562 (S.D. Ill. 1994» (emphasis in original). See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 
664, 669-72 (5th Cir. 1989). 
189 Private parties, including owners of land adjacent to a hazardous waste site, are accorded 
a private right of action for response costs under this provision. See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 
F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
170 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). EPA's Natural Contingency Regulations adopted in 1990 
provide that a private party's response actions in substantial compliance with specified NCP 
criteria will be considered consistent with the NCP. See Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 823 
F. Supp. 1218, 1239-40 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
171 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). The United States, a state, and an Indian tribe are the only 
entities authorized to collect such natural resources damages. See itt. § 9607(f)(1). 
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(4) the costs of health assessment or health effects study carried 
out by the federal government under section 104(i)172 of CERCLA.I73 
D. PRPs Subject to Liability Under CERCLA 
Four categories of persons (which can include federal, state, and 
local governments) can be held liable as PRPs under section 107: 
(1) [Present Owner or Operator:] the owner or operator174 of a 
vessel or a facility at the time of a release, or a threatened release 
causing the incurrence of response costs, from the vessel or facil-
ity;175 
(2) [Past Owner or Operator:] any person who at the time of 
disposaP76 of any hazardous substance owned or operated any 
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of 
. [when there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the 
incurring of response costs, of a hazardous substance from the 
facility];I77 
(3) [Arranger-Generator:] any person who by contract, agree-
ment, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or ar-
ranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, 
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by 
172 See id. § 9604(i). 
173 See id. § 9607(a)(4)(D). 
174 Although 42 U .S.C. § 9607(a)(1) provides for liability of "the owner and operator of a vessel 
or facility," the courts have held that a person is liable under this section if they are either an 
owner or an operator of a facility or vessel at the time of a release or a threatened release of a 
hazardous substance from the facility or vessel. See, e.g., Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994). 
175 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I). 
176 The term "disposal" is defined by section 101(29) of CERCLA as having the meaning 
provided by section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). 
Section 1004(3) of that Act defines "disposal" as: 
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid 
waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or 
hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted 
into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. 
42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1994). 
Some courts hold that "disposal" includes so-called "passive" disposal (when substances leak 
from soil, containers, or equipment previously placed at or dumped at the facility). See, e.g., 
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 844-46 (4th Cir. 1992). A number of 
courts have held, however, that "disposal" does not occur when hazardous substances, which 
were previously placed at or dumped at a facility, migrate or leach to different locations in the 
soil or groundwater. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 
1351--53 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
177 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). This section "merely requires that one [own or] operate the facility 
at which hazardous substances are disposed of, at the time of the disposal; it does not require 
any involvement in the disposal activities themselves." United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 
1082, 1090 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel 
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such 
hazardous substances [from which there is a release, or a threat-
ened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a 
hazardous substance];178 
(4) [Transporter Who Selects Disposal Facility:] any person who 
accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels, or sites se-
lected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threat-
ened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a 
hazardous substance.179 
1. Owner/Operator Liability Under CERCLA 
Because sections 107(a)(1) and 107(a)(2) make a person liable either 
if the person is an owner of a facility or if the person is an operator 
of a facility, a person can be liable under these sections if they own a 
facility which is operated by another person, or if they operate a 
facility which is owned by another person. Therefore, a governmental 
entity can be liable under these sections either on the basis of gov-
ernmental ownership of a facility (such as a federally owned military 
basel80 or a municipally owned sanitary landfill),181 01' on the basis of 
governmental operation of a facility owned by another person. l82 
"The definition of 'operator' in CERCLA gives little guidance to the 
courts in determining if a particular person or entity is liable as an 
operator because the statute circularly defines 'operator' as 'any per-
son ... operating such facility.ml83 All courts recognize, however, that 
an "operator" of a facility can be an entity such as a corporation or a 
governmental body,l84 as well as an individual person-and that both 
178 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). 
179 [d. § 9607(a)(4). 
180 See, e.g., United States v. Allied Corp., Nos. C-83-5898-FMS, C-83-5896-FMS, 1990 WL 
515976, at *1-*3, (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
181 See, e.g., New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Gloucester Envtl. Management Serv., 
Inc., 719 F. Supp. 325, 328 (D.N.J. 1989). 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Env. L. Inst.) 20,656 (C.D. Cal. 
Jan. 9, 1990). 
183 FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994) (en bane) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii» (defining the term "owner or operator" of an offshore or 
onshore facility as "any person owning or operating such facility"). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(i) 
defines "the owner or operator" of a vessel as "any person owning, operating, or chartering by 
demise, such vessel .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) also defines "owner or operator" in several other 
contexts, and provides some exceptions from the definition of owner or operator. 
184 See, e.g., FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843. 
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such an entity and one or more individuals can be an "operator" of a 
single facility under sections 107(a)(1) and 107(a)(2).186 
However, the United States Supreme Court has not adopted stand-
ards or criteria for determining when a person will be held to be an 
"owner" or "operator" of a facility under sections 107(a)(1) and 
107(a)(2), and the lower federal courts have not adopted a "universal 
formula" for determining when a person is an "operator" of a facility 
under section 107(a)(1) or 107(a)(2).186 Some courts, following what is 
called an "actual control" test for operator liability, hold that in order 
for a person to be held liable as an operator of a facility under section 
107(a)(1) or 107(a)(2), the person "must play an active role in running 
the facility, typically involving hands-on, day-to-day participation in 
the facility's management."187 An alternative "actual control" test used 
by some other courts for determining operator liability under CER-
CLA focuses on "the degree of control that [a person] is able to exert 
over the activity [at the facility] causing the pollution."188 A third test 
(called the "authority to control" test) applied by some courts imposes 
operator liability under CERCLA upon a person who had the author-
ity or power to control the operations or decisions at the facility 
involving the disposal of hazardous substances, even if that person did 
not affirmatively exercise that power or authority to manage the 
facility or the pollution-causing activity.189 
180 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). 
188 See Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 155 B.R. 890, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
187 Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 
1994); see also Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, Nos. CV-9O--1072, CV-
90--1073, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14420, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1992) (stating that ''to be liable 
as an operator, a party must currently participate in decisions regarding the overall operations 
at a facility"). 
188 CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 788 (W.O. Mich. 1989), motions far 
summary judgment denied, 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.O. Mich. 1991), judgment entered, 777 F. 
Supp. 549 (W.O. Mich. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.; United States v. Cordova 
Chern. Co., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gurley,43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that "an individual may not be held liable as an operator under § 9607(a)(2) unless he 
or she (1) had authority to determine whether hazardous wastes would be disposed of and to 
determine the method of disposal and (2) actually exercised that authority, either by personally 
performing the tasks necessary to dispose of the hazardous wastes or by directing others to 
perform these tasks"). 
180 See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Inc., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that "a secured 
creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad 
to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose''}; 
East Bay Mun. Uti!. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 43 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 
1918, 1930 (D.D.C. 1996) (stating that ''the authority to control must be specifically related to 
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However, the one recurring theme that does emerge from a can-
vassing of cases discussing operator liability is that "courts have 
broadly construed ... 'operating' in order to effectuate the per-
ceived intent of Congress that liability under Section 107(a) 
should extend to all who profit from the treatment or disposal of 
hazardous waste .... " At the same time, courts have been careful 
not to read CERCLA as creating unlimited liability for those only 
tangentially or remotely involved with hazardous substances.1oo 
Consequently, whether a governmental entity is held liable as an 
"operator" of a facility in a particular case under section 107(a)(1) or 
section 107(a)(2) will depend not only upon the test for operator 
liability which is applied by the court, but also upon whether govern-
mental liability under CERCLA is viewed as consistent with CER-
CLA's purposes.191 
2. Arranger (Generator) Liability Under CERCLA 
Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA on its face requires that in order for 
a person to be liable as an "arranger" (i.e., "generator"), the person 
must have arranged (by contract, agreement, or otherwise)192 for the 
disposal or treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
the arranger, by another person or entity at a facility or incineration 
vessel owned or operated by another person and which contains such 
hazardous substances. l93 
A person can be liable as an arranger under section 107(a)(3) for 
arranging for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances which 
the person does not own or physically possess, if such person has 
constructive possession of the substances (such as through supervi-
the control of waste disposal" and "general authority to control operation of the facility is not 
the relevant legal standard"). 
190 Reading Co., 155 B.R. at 908. 
191 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. United States Oep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en 
banc). 
192 See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Oetrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993). 
193 A person may be liable as an arranger under this section even though the person did not 
know that the substances would be deposited at a particular site, or in fact believed they would 
be deposited elsewhere. United States v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (W.O. Okla. 1990). 
The phrase "containing such hazardous substances" at the end of section 107(a)(3) has been 
interpreted to mean that there must be evidence that an arranger's hazardous substances were 
shipped to the particular facility and "that hazardous substances similar to these contained in 
the defendant's waste remained present at the time of release." United States v. Monsanto Co., 
858 F.2d 160, 169 n.15 (4th Cir. 1988). Proof that the arranger's specific hazardous substances 
remained at the facility at the time of release is not required under section 107(a)(3). See id. at 
169. 
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sion over the transportation and disposal of the substances).l94 An 
arranger under section 107(a)(3) can include an entity such as a cor-
poration or a governmental body195 as well as an individual-and in 
some cases both an entity and an individual can be liable under section 
107(a)(3) for arranging the disposal or treatment of particular hazard-
ous substances.l96 
As is the case with operator liability under CERCLA, there is no 
universally adopted standard for determining when a person is liable 
as an arranger (generator) under section 107(a)(3). The Supreme 
Court has not adopted standards or criteria for determining arranger 
liability under section 107(a)(3), but lower courts interpret section 
107(a)(3) liberally to hold liable all persons who profit from the gen-
eration and disposal of hazardous substances. l97 Some lower courts 
have held that in order for a person to have such constructive posses-
sion, the person must have "some nexus" with the owner of the 
hazardous substances.19B The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, has held that a person can be liable 
as an arranger under section 107(a)(3) if the person had the authority 
to control, and did in fact exercise actual or substantial control over, 
the arrangement for disposal, or the off-site disposal, of hazardous 
substances, without proof that the person had the specific intent to 
arrange for the disposal of hazardous substances.l99 Under this Eighth 
Circuit approach, a person can be held liable under section 107(a)(3) 
without proof that the person ever personally participated in, or had 
any knowledge or awareness of, arrangements for disposal of hazard-
ous substances at the facility.2°O There must be "some level of actual 
participation in, or exercise of control over, activities that are causally 
connected to, or have some nexus with, the arrangement for disposal 
of hazardous substance or the offsite disposal itself."201 In United 
States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemical, the Eighth Circuit adopted an 
194 United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986). 
196 See, e.g., FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 845-46 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Stringfellow, 20 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990). 
196 See, e.g., Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d at 726. 
197 See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 n.8 (8th Cir. 1989). 
198 Hassayampa Steering Cornrn. v. Arizona, 768 F. Supp. 697, 702 (D. Ariz. 1991); Stilloe v. 
Alrny Bros., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 95, 99 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), motion to dismiss granted, 782 F. 
Supp. 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 871-72 (D. 
Del. 1989); New York v. City of Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. 88, 36 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). 
199 See United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1995). 
200 See id. at 1088. 
201 See id. at 108fHl8 (footnote omitted). 
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alternative test for section 107(a)(3) arranger liability under which a 
person can be held liable as arranger if: (1) that person supplied raw 
materials to another manufacturer's facility which the person had 
hired to produce a final product; (2) that person retained ownership 
of those raw materials, the work in progress, and the final product; 
and (3) that person knew that the generation of hazardous substances 
was inherent in that other manufacturer's production process.202 Some 
courts have adopted yet another test for arranger liability under 
section 107(a)(3), under which a person is an arranger if they had the 
obligation and the authority to arrange for disposal of a hazardous 
substance (even if that person did not actually exercise that authority 
and was not actually involved in arranging the disposal or treatment 
of the substance).203 Whether a governmental entity will be held li-
able as an arranger in a particular case may depend not only upon 
which test for arranger liability is applied by the court, but also upon 
whether the court finds that governmental liability would be consis-
tent with CERCLA's purpose of imposing liability on all those who 
profit from treatment or disposal of hazardous substances.2M 
3. Transporter Liability Under CERCLA 
A person is liable under section 107(a)(4) of CERCLA if the person 
accepts or accepted any hazardous substance for transport to a facility 
incineration vessel or site which the transporter selected.206 A "trans-
porter" therefore is liable under this section only if the transporter 
selected the site, facility, or incineration vessel where the transported 
wastes were taken and from where there was release or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance.206 "To be held liable under 
§ 107(a)(4), the transporter must be so engaged in the selection proc-
ess that holding it liable furthers one of CERCLA's central objectives: 
Z02 Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1373; see infra notes 326 and 354-55 and accompa-
nying text. 
203 See General Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmission, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(dictum). 
2M See, e.g., Lincoln v. Republic Ecology Corp., 765 F. Supp. 633 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
205 At least one court has held that a person who possesses and transports a hazardous 
substance to a third party's facility for disposal also can be held liable as an arranger under 
section 107(a)(3). State v. SCA Serv., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Bee Gerald M. 
Giordano, When IB a Transporter an Arranger Under CERCLA?, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,665 (Nov. 1994). 
206 See Tippins, Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 1994) (interpreting the phrase 
"selected by such person" in section 107(a)(4) as modifying "facilities" and "incineration vessels" 
as well as "sites"). 
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to hold all persons actively involved in the storage or disposal of 
hazardous waste financially accountable for the cost of remedying 
harm to the human health or the environment."207 
Because corporate entities as well as individuals can be held liable 
under section 107(a)(4),208 governmental entities, which generally are 
subject to liability under section 107 to the same extent as private 
persons, also should be subject to liability under section 107(a)(4) 
when a government agent or employee, acting within the scope of 
governmental agency or employment, transported hazardous sub-
stances to a facility selected by the agent or employee.209 
A person can held liable under section 107(a)(4) not only when the 
person "ultimately selects" the disposal facility,210 but also when the 
person "actively participates in the disposal decision to the extent of 
having had substantial input into which facility was ultimately cho-
sen."211 Under this approach, a person can be liable under section 
107(a)(4) without personally accepting the waste for transport or 
personally participating in the selection of the disposal facility, if the 
person had the authority to control disposal decisions by the trans-
porter and was aware of the transporter's acceptance of the waste and 
its participation in the selection of the facility (thus effectively acqui-
escing in the decisions to transport the waste to the selected facil-
ity).212 Governmental entities should be subject to transporter liability 
under section 107(a)(4) when a governmental agent or employee act-
ing within the scope of government agency or employment meets the 
applicable standard for transporter liability under section 107(a)(4) 
2f11 I d. at 95. 
2()8See id. 
2()8 In such a case, in addition to the governmental entity being liable under section 107(a)(4), 
the individual agents or employees of the government who accepted the substances for trans-
port and selected the disposal or treatment facility to which the substances would be trans-
ported, also could be personally liable under section 107(a)(4). See United States v. USX Corp., 
68 F.3d 811, 825 (3d Cir. 1995). 
210 See 'I'ippins, Inc., 37 F.3d at 94. 
211 'I'ippins, 37 F.3d at 94. "The substantiality of the input will be a function, in part, of whether 
the decisionmaker relied upon the transporter's special expertise in reaching its final decision." 
Id. at 94-95. A transporter can be considered to have selected a site under section 107(a)(4) 
when it suggests several potential sites to a generator customer from which to pick, and the 
customer relied upon the transporter's expertise in the field of hazardous waste management 
in deciding the appropriate means and location for disposal of its wastes. See id. at 95. However, 
"[al transporter clearly does not select the disposal site merely by following the directions of 
the party with which it contracts." Id. 
212 See United States v. Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, 1995 WL 617823 (3d Cir. 1995); United 
States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 825. 
82 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:47 
and governmental liability would be consistent with CERCLA's pur-
pose of imposing liability on all those who profit from the treatment 
or disposal of hazardous substances. 
E. Governmental Liability as CERCLA PRP as a Result of 
Governmental Regulation of Other Persons 
Courts generally hold that federal, state, and local governments are 
not liable under section 107 of CERCLA solely on the basis of gov-
ernmental activities involved in regulating other persons and busi-
nesses. A number of courts have held that federal, state, and local 
governments are not liable under section 107 either as an arranger or 
as an operator solely on the basis of a governmental entity's actions 
or failure to act in regulating the disposal of hazardous wastes or 
substances at a facility owned by another person.213 Several other 
courts similarly have held that a governmental entity is not liable 
under section 107 solely on the basis of the government's regulation, 
at a facility owned by another person, of activities involving the 
production, treatment, or disposal of hazardous substances.214 And one 
court has held that a local government's adoption and implementation 
of an ordinance to abate a public nuisance (created by abandoned 
vehicles on public and private property) was governmental regulatory 
conduct that does not, as a matter of law, give rise to liability as an 
arranger under section 107(a)(3).216 These holdings that a governmen-
tal entity cannot be held liable under section 107 solely on the basis 
of governmental activity in regulating other persons have been based 
upon determinations that such activities alone are not sufficient to 
make the governmental entity a liable PRP under section 107.216 No 
court has based a holding of non-liability for governmental regulatory 
218 United States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988); Hassayampa Steering Comm. 
v. Arizona, 768 F. Supp. 697, 702 (D. Ariz. 1991); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. 
Supp. 854, 859, 874 (D. Del. 1989); New York v. City of Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. 33, 36 (N.D.N.Y. 
1988). 
214 See United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 809, 810 (8th Cir. 1995) (regulation 
by federal government under Walsh-Healy Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35(b)-(d) (1994) of worker health 
and safety, and under Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U .S.C. app. § 2061 (1994), of govern-
ment constructor's facility, held insufficient basis to hold United States liable under either 
section 107(a)(2) or 107(a)(3) of CERCLA) em denied, 515 U.S. 1158 (1995); Maxus Energy 
Corp. v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 399, 408 (N.D. Tex. 1995). 
215 See Lincoln v. Republic Ecology Corp., 765 F. Supp. 633, 639 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
216 See Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d at 808; Dart Indus., 847 F.2d at 146; Maxus Energy Corp., 
898 F. Supp. at 406-7; Hassayampa Steering Comm., 768 F. Supp. at 702; Lincoln, 765 F. Supp 
at 638--39; New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 874; City of Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. at 36. 
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activities on the grounds that Congress has not waived the sovereign 
immunity of governmental entities from liability. 
In fact, as discussed earlier in this Article,217 the United States' 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in FMC Corp. v. United States 
Department of Commerce, rejected the federal government's argu-
ment that governmental regulatory activities should be per se im-
mune from liability under section 107.218 Although this holding of no 
sovereign immunity under CERCLA for governmental regulatory 
activities applied only to the federal government, this holding also 
should be extended to state and local governments because CERCLA 
waives state and local government sovereign immunity to the same 
extent that it waives the federal government's sovereign immunity.219 
Under the Third Circuit's approach in FMC Corp., a government can 
be liable under section 107 "when it engages in regulatory activities 
extensive enough to make it an operator of a facility or an arranger 
of the disposal of hazardous wastes even though no private party 
could engage in the regulatory activities at issue.''220 Following this 
approach, the Third Circuit in FMC Corp. held that the United States 
was liable under section 107 both as an operator of a privately owned 
facility, and as an arranger for disposal of hazardous substances at the 
facility, as a result of the federal government's involvement during 
World War II with the private facility which produced materials for 
the United States' war effort.221 
As mentioned earlier, other courts have held that governmental 
entities should not be liable PRPs under section 107 solely on the basis 
of governmental regulatory activities.222 Some of these courts take the 
position that liability should not be imposed upon a governmental 
entity "engaged in legitimate sovereign, as opposed to proprietary or 
commercial, functions."223 One reason these courts give for making 
217 See supra notes 43-61 and accompanying text. 
218 See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 838-42 (3d Cir. 1994) (en 
banc). 
219 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). 
220 FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 840. 
221 See id. at 843-46; see also infra notes 311--82 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
223 Lincoln v. Republic Ecology Corp., 765 F. Supp. 633, 637--88 (C.D. Cal. 1991). See also 
United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 761 F. Supp. 725, 730--31, (W.D. Wash. 1991) 
(stating that Congress intended to impose liability on federal government under section 107 
when it "acts in a fashion analogous to that of a business concern," but not when EPA engages 
in "regulatory efforts" at a hazardous waste site); United States v. American Color & Chern. 
Corp. 858 F. Supp. 445, 449 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (stating ''liability can be imposed only when the 
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such a distinction is that holding a governmental entity liable under 
CERCLA for its regulatory activities would be inconsistent with 
Congress' "intent that the cleanup costs be absorbed by those entities 
who can best send proper price signals to the market-those who 
profit from transactions involving hazardous substances or cause their 
release."224 Other reasons given by these courts are that governmen-
tal entities would be reluctant to exercise governmental functions to 
abate public nuisances or protect the environment if they were sub-
ject to potential liability under CERCLA for such regulatory activi-
ties, and that private parties engaged in hazardous substances trans-
actions, and who actually cause or contribute to hazardous substances 
releases, "will have less of an incentive to operate their businesses in 
an environmentally sound manner" if CERCLA liability were ex-
tended to governmental entities engaged in such regulatory activi-
ties.225 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit has held that a municipality can be liable as an operator under 
section 107(a)(3) when it arranges, in its sovereign capacity, for dis-
posal or treatment of solid wastes generated by the municipality and 
its citizens, at a sanitary landfill owned by another person.226 The 
Second Circuit's reasoning in support of this holding was that al-
though a municipality may be exempted from CERCLA liability 
either under the sovereign function exemption in section 101(20)(D)227 
or under section 107(d)(2),228 "Congress limited the sovereign function 
exception to those situations where liability is premised on the state 
or local government entity being an 'owner or operator' of a vessel or 
facility" and did not extend the exception to arranger liability under 
section 107(a)(3).229 The court concluded that a municipality can be 
liable as an arranger when there "is a sufficient nexus ... between 
government acts as the operator of a business concern, not when it is acting in a governmental 
or regulatory capacity"). 
224 Lincoln, 765 F. Supp. at 638. 
225 See id. 
226 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992); accord Transportation 
Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F. Supp. 931, 938-39 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
22742 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1994). This provision exempts a state or municipal government 
from "owner or operator" liability when the government "acquired ownership or control invol-
untarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which 
the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign." See id; see 
also supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
228 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2). See supra notes 102'''{)8 and accompanying text. 
229 B.F. Goodrich Co., 958 F.2d at 1199. 
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the municipality and the hazardous substances, one that does not exist 
... only for promulgating disposal regulations or for permitting dis-
posal facilities.''230 The Second Circuit held that the facts in the record 
established a prima facie case for plaintiffs because such a nexus 
existed and held the municipal defendants liable as arrangers under 
section,107(a)(3) because of their actions in arranging for disposal and 
treatment of municipal solid wastes at two privately owned sanitary 
landfills, even though the municipalities acted in their sovereign 
status in doing SO.231 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, how-
ever, has held that a governmental entity cannot be held to have the 
requisite ownership or possession of hazardous substances required 
for arranger liability "merely because it had statutory or regulatory 
authority to control activities which involved the production, treat-
ment or disposal of hazardous substances."232 
The court in New York v. City of Johnstown followed similar rea-
soning in holding that the state of New York could not be liable as an 
arranger under section 107(a)(3) on the basis of the state's alleged 
failure to regulate two solid waste management facilities (sanitary 
landfills) in accordance with the state's own sanitary landfill and per-
mitting regulations, and the state's actions in permitting or directing 
hazardous substances to be placed in a particular facility (after an 
another such available facility had been closed).233 The state of New 
York initially had sued two cities that owned and operated these two 
facilities (under sections 107(a)(1) and (2»; and generators of wastes 
that allegedly were deposited at these facilities (under section 
107(a)(3», to recover response cleanup costs and natural resources 
damages. The state previously had entered into agreements with the 
230 [d. 
23] See id. at 1196-99. The court noted, however, that inequitable and disproportionate burdens 
upon liable municipalities can be avoided if courts exercise their powers to equitably apportion 
response costs in contribution actions under section 113(f)(1). See id. at 1206. A federal district 
court in California similarly has held municipalities that have a duty under state law to provide 
waste collection services within their jurisdiction were liable as arrangers under section 
107(a)(3) as a result of their contracting with private disposal companies to have the companies 
haul away municipal waste and exercising "significant control" over those haulers through 
contracts and ordinances. See Transportation Leasing Co., 861 F. Supp. at 955. The court found 
that the municipalities' statutory duty to provide for waste disposal, and their significant control 
over residential and commercial wastes through their contracts with the haulers and through 
municipal ordinances, satisfied section 107(a)(3)'s requirement that an arranger "own[ed] or 
possess[ed]" the disposed wastes. See id. 
232 United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 1995). 
233 See New York v. City of Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. 33, 36 (N.D. N.Y. 1988). 
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two cities that provided for closure of the facilities by specified dates 
and operation of them in the interim without permits, but in accord-
ance with the state's solid waste management regulations. One of the 
defendant waste generators in the state's suit filed a counterclaim 
under section 113(f)(1),234 alleging that the state of New York was 
itself liable under section 107(a)(3) because it "otherwise arranged 
for" disposal of hazardous substances at these two facilities, by either 
permitting or directing wastes to be placed at the two facilities.236 
The court in City of Johnstown, however, dismissed these counter-
claims.236 The court reasoned that in order for a person to be liable as 
an arranger under section l07(a)(3), "it must be shown ... that the 
State owned or possessed the hazardous substances of which it ar-
ranged to dispose" and that "there has to be some nexus between the 
allegedly responsible person and the owner of the hazardous sub-
stances before a party can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(3)."237 The court concluded that there was no such nexus 
between the state and the defendant waste generator, with the court 
noting that "the state was attempting to remediate the hazardous 
waste problems at both sites .... "238 
Several months before the City of Johnstown decision was issued, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, in 
United States v. Dart Industries, that neither governmental regula-
tory activity nor governmental failure to exercise regulatory author-
ity is sufficient to make a governmental entity liable as an "operator" 
under section 107.239 In Dart Industries, the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's holding that the South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environment (DHEC) was not an owner or operator 
under section 107 of the abandoned Fort Lawn, South Carolina haz-
ardous waste disposal site as a result of DHEC's regulatory activities 
involving the site.240 The United States, after completing a surface 
cleanup of the Fort Lawn site after private hazardous waste opera-
tions ceased there, brought suit under section 107, to recover its 
cleanup costs against twenty persons who allegedly had generated 
certain hazardous substances found at the site.241 Three of these gen-
234 42 U.S.C. § 9613(1)(1) (1994). 
235 See City of Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. at 36. 
236 [d. at 36-38. 
237 [d. at 36. 
238 [d. 
239 United States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). 
240 [d. at 146. 
241 See United States v. Carolawn Co., 698 F. Supp. 616, 618 (D.S.C. 1987). 
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erator defendants filed a third-party complaint against DREC alleg-
ing that DREC was liable under section 107 for the federal govern-
ment's cleanup costs, because DREC allegedly controlled hazardous 
waste disposal operations at the Fort Lawn site,242 and because 
DREC allegedly "approved and disapproved applications to store 
wastes at Fort Lawn, inspected the site, and required proper trans-
portation of the wastes delivered to Fort Lawn.''243 The district court 
concluded that DREC "did not at any time own or operate" the site, 
finding that "all the third party complaint alleges against DREC is a 
series of regulatory actions consistent with its statutory mandate."244 
Affirming this holding of the District Court, the Fourth Circuit in 
Dart Industries held that DREC was not an owner or operator of the 
site within the meaning of section 107, reasoning: 
First under § 9601(20)(A), an owner or operator includes the en-
tity that "controlled activities at such facility" before a declaration 
of bankruptcy. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii). The generators argue 
the DHEC controlled the activities at Fort Lawn before Caro-
lawn abandoned the site in 1980. During this time, DHEC loosely 
regulated the activity at the site pursuant to [South Carolina 
statutes regulating hazardous waste disposal]. DHEC approved 
or disapproved applications to store wastes at Fort Lawn, in-
spected the site, and required proper transportation of the wastes 
delivered to Fort Lawn. However, there is no allegation that 
DHEC went beyond this governmental supervision and directly 
managed Carolawn's employees or finances at the Fort Lawn site. 
Thus the court finds that DHEC is not an owner or operator under 
§ 9601(20)(A)(iii).246 
The Fourth Circuit then addressed the defendant generator's addi-
tional argument that DREC was an owner or operator under section 
101(20)(D) because it did not fall within that section's express exemp-
tion for governmental units that acquire ownership through bank-
ruptcy, abandonment, or other involuntary means and "had caused or 
contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance ... .''246 The defendant generators argued that after the Fort 
Lawn site was abandoned in 1980, DREC caused or contributed to 
the waste release by approving transportation of one generator's 
wastes to the site, by failing to force a cleanup of the site, and by 
242 See id. at 618-19. 
243 Dart Indus., 847 F.2d at 146. 
244 Carolawn Co., 698 F. Supp. at 621. 
240 Dart Indus., 847 F.2d at 146. 
246Id. 
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refusing to allow generators to remove their wastes from the site.247 
The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument on the following grounds: 
As with the claim under § 960 1 (20)(A), these allegations that 
DHEC did not properly monitor the site or facilitate the cleanup 
fail to characterize DHEC as an owner or operator. The gener-
ators are unable to specify any ''hands on" activities by DHEC 
that contributed to the release of hazardous wastes. The District 
Court appropriately described DHEC's activities as merely "a 
series of regulatory actions .... " DHEC may have inadequately 
enforced the state environmental regulations. However, such un-
fortunate deficiencies do not constitute ownership or control as 
defined in § 9601; the DHEC is not liable as an owner or operator 
under § 9607.248 
In its earlier discussion of the defendants' argument based upon 
section 10 1(20) (A) (iii) (which equates "controlled activities" at a facil-
ity with "operates" a facility in its next-to-Iast sentence), the Fourth 
Circuit in Dart Industries implied that a person is an operator of a 
facility if the person directly manages a hazardous waste facility's 
employees or the facility's finances.249 Some courts follow such an 
actual control approach to operator liability, defining an operator to 
be a person that manages or controls the operations of the facility.250 
The Fourth Circuit, in its discussion of the defendants' argument 
based upon section 101(20)(D), alternatively implied that a person is 
an operator of a facility if the person engaged in "hands on" activities 
(a term which the court did not define) that contributed to the release 
of a hazardous substance.251 This approach seems to follow an alterna-
tive actual control test for operator liability that states that a person 
who manages, or controls, hazardous waste disposal activities or ac-
tivities that result in the release of a hazardous substance is an 
operator of a facility.252 
Under Dart Industries, a governmental entity is not an operator of 
a facility solely as a result of government regulation of hazardous 
waste disposal, or of failure of governmental to regulate hazardous 
247 See id. 
2481d. 
249Id. 
250 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
261 United States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988). 
262 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit subsequently held that a 
person can be an "operator" of a facility under section 107 if the person has "authority to control" 
disposal of hazardous substances at a facility. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 
F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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waste disposal properly or to require cleanup of a hazardous waste 
site.263 However, the court in Dart Industries does not define what 
constitutes "hands on" activities that will make a governmental entity 
an operator of a facility under section 107, and therefore does not 
indicate whether a governmental entity would be held to be an opera-
tor of a facility it engages in response cleanup activities under section 
104 of CERCLA, or other authority, that result in a release of a 
hazardous substance.2M As discussed in a subsequent section of this 
Article, a governmental entity should not be held liable under section 
107 solely on the basis of cleanup activities under CERCLA or other 
authority, even if such cleanup activities were not consistent with the 
National Contingency Plan or resulted in the release of additional 
hazardous substances.266 
Relying upon City of Johnstown and Dart Industries, the Delaware 
district court held, one year later, in United States v. New Castle 
County, that the state of Delaware was not liable under section 107 
either as an operator of a landfill site, or as an 'arranger of disposal of 
hazardous substances at the Tybouts Corner landfill facility solely on 
the basis of the state's regulation of hazardous substances at the 
site.266 In this case, the United States had brought suit against New 
Castle County, Delaware, an individual, and two corporations, seek-
ing, as part of the requested relief, the recovery of response costs it 
had incurred in responding to the alleged release and threatened 
release of hazardous substances at the landfill.267 The defendants filed 
third-party complaints against the state of Delaware, which claimed 
that the state was liable under section 107 as an operator of the landfill 
and as an arranger of disposal of hazardous substances at the landfill 
as a result of the state's regulation of the disposal of wastes at the 
site.268 The state's regulatory activities with respect to the site in-
volved the state's implementation and enforcement of various regula-
tions adopted under the state's solid waste disposal statute.269 These 
regulatory activities included selection of the site for the landfill, 
planning and design of the landfill and its operations, determining the 
types of wastes to be disposed of at the site, issuing a permit for the 
263 See Dart Indus., 847 F.2d at 146. 
254Id. at 144. 
256 See infra notes 360-425 and accompanying text. 
266 United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 876 (D. Del. 1989). 
257 See id. at 857. 
263 See id. 
269 See id. at 862. 
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landfill, requiring users of the site to submit periodic reports to the 
state detailing the landfill's conditions, and monitoring the site on a 
continuous basis to ensure that the parties working at the landfill 
complied with the statutory and regulatory standards for waste dis-
posal at the landfill.260 
The court in New Castle County held that these regulatory activi-
ties by the state were insufficient to hold the state liable under CER-
CLA, either as an operator or as an arranger.261 The court found that 
the state's actions "do not exceed 'mere regulation nor do they con-
stitute active, voluntary, "hands on" participation in the day-to-day 
management and operations' of the site.'1262 Although noting that 
courts have interpreted the term operator broadly to effectuate Con-
gress' perceived intent that all those who profit from the treatment 
or disposal of hazardous waste should be liable under section 107, the 
court in New Castle County stated that "surely, however, there must 
be some limitations contemplated by CERCLA because in a sense, 
every member of society profits from the disposal and treatment of 
hazardous and non-hazardous wastes."263 The court found that CER-
CLA's "legislative history and cases indicate that it is relevant in 
determining liability to consider whether the 'person' charged with 
CERCLA liability profited in a commercial sense, as opposed to a 
general societal health sense."2M 
260 See id. 
261 United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 870, 874 (D. Del. 1989). 
262 [d. at 870. 
263 [d. at 865. 
264 [d. The court cited S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Congo 2d Sess., at 13 (1980), the following portion 
of which the court had quoted earlier: 
[CERCLNs] strict liability ... assures that those who benefit financially from a 
commercial activity intemaJize the health and environmental costs of that activity 
into the cost of doing business .... To establish provisions of liability any less than 
strict, joint, and several liability would be to condone a system in which innocent 
victims bear the burdens of releases, while those who conduct commerce in hazard-
ous substances which cause such damage benefit with relative impunity. 
[d. at 858 (emphasis added by court). The court in New Castle County also quoted the following 
from State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff: 
It is also clear from the Congressional debates that Congress intended to have the 
chemical industry pay for the costs of this cleanup. EPA argued that "society should 
not bear the cost of protecting the public from hazards produced in the past by a 
generator, transporter, consumer, or dump site owner-operator who has profited or 
otherwise benefitted from commerce involving these substances and now wishes to 
be insulated from any continuing responsibilities for the present hazards to society that 
have been created ... relieving industry of responsibility establishes a precedent 
seriously adverse to the public interest .... " 
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The court in New Castle County concluded that a number of cases266 
that had held parent corporations, corporate shareholders, corporate 
executives, or corporate employees liable as operators under section 
107, were not controlling on the issue of a state's liability for regula-
tory activities.266 These cases were stated to be "factually distinguish-
able in that they all involved some form of a corporate-like entity 
and/or an individual who actually did (or could have) controlled or 
managed that entity"267 and involved an assertion of liability "against 
a person who had commercial, financial or proprietary interest at 
stake in relation to the hazardous substance."268 These cases were 
described as "merely following the statutory mandate that 'individu-
als,' and not just the corporations they work for or own, can be held 
liable as 'persons' . . . and thus were 'owners or operators."l269 The 
court concluded that "[b]y imposing liability on these individuals, the 
courts were merely following the Congressional policy that those who 
plant their polluted seed should pay for the fruit they bear."270 How-
ever, the court also stated that a person actually must exercise control 
over a facility in order to be held liable under section 107 as an 
operator of that facility, and "'[m]ere ability to exercise control as a 
result of the financial relationship of the parties is insufficient for 
liability to attach .... "'271 
The court concluded in New Castle County, however, that the state 
of Delaware had participated at the sanitary landfill involved in the 
suit "in its regulatory capacity as protector of the health, safety and 
welfare of its citizens. It did not participate or have the ability to 
United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D. Del. 1989) (quoting Brown v. 
Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983» (emphasis added by New Castle County) 
(citation omitted). 
The New Castle County court added that "[t]his is further borne out by the fact that Congress 
imposed certain taxes upon various industries, e.g., oils, petrochemicals, chemicals, etc., to help 
set up the fund to pay for response costs." [d. 
266 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Idaho v. Bunker 
Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. 
Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2131 
(D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 
(W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984). 
266 See New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 866. 
267 [d. 
268 [d. 
269 [d. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20». 
270 [d. (citing S.Rep. No. 848, 96th Congo 2d Sess. 98, at 13 (1980». 
271 United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 866 (D. Del. 1989) (quoting Rockwell 
Intern. Corp. v. IU Intern. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988». 
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control the site with any proprietary or financial interest at stake. The 
State did not have any commercial interests at stake in the site."272 
The court added that the state's testing, reporting, and monitoring 
requirements applicable to the sanitary landfill "were all required as 
part of the permit approval process and regulatory mandate of the 
[state] Disposal Code" and that "these day-to-day operational man-
dates amount to nothing more than the implementation by the State 
of its regulatory requirements."273 
The court then analyzed the Fourth Circuit's Dart Industries274 
decision, finding "several points of comparison and contrast,"275 and 
then found, "based on an analysis of the present case law and what 
meager legislative history is pertinent,"276 that the following factors 
should be considered in determining whether to impose liability upon 
a person under section 107 as an operator: 
whether the person sought to be strapped with operator status 
controlled the finances of the facility; managed the employees of 
the facility; managed the daily business operations of the facility; 
was responsible for the maintenance of environmental control at 
the facility; and conferred or received any commercial or economic 
benefit from the facility, other than the payment or receipt of 
taxes. The recitation of these factors is not intended to be exclu-
sive but only part of a para materia inquiry in determining op-
erator status .... Also, operator status will not necessarily attach 
if anyone of these factors is found to exist. Each case must be 
determined based upon the unique factual situation presented.277 
Applying these criteria to the facts of the case, the court concluded 
in New Castle County that "considering the totality of circum-
stances," the state of Delaware should not be held liable under section 
272 [d. at 866-ti7. 
273 [d. at 869. 
274 United States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). 
276 See New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 868. 
276 See id. at 869. 
277 See id. The court in United States v. Stringfellow, affinning a Special Master's Order on 
Directed Verdict that held the state of California liable under section 107 as an operator of a 
sanitary landfill, held that operator is defined "by looking at the degree of control which is 
exercised" (which "need not to be day to day"), based on the following 11 factors "weighed as 
a whole": 
expertise and knowledge of dangers of hazardous waste, conception of idea of the site, 
design of the site, supervision, inspection, receipt of reports of the site, hiring or 
approving hiring of employees, detennining operational responsibilities, control of 
disposal, ability to discover and abate harm, public declarations of responsibility, par-
ticipation in opening and closing of site, and benefitting from the existence of the site. 
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107 as an operator of the sanitary landfill.278 The court added that 
whether or not Delaware's regulatory program "mayor may not have 
been more expansive or exacting than another state's regulatory 
program should not be the basis for holding that the state of Delaware 
was an operator of the site under CERCLA."279 
As a final point in support of its holding that the state of Delaware 
was not liable as an operator of the sanitary landfill, the court in New 
Castle County distinguished the Special Master's decision in United 
States v. Stringfellow.280 In Stringfellow, a Special Master held the 
state of California liable under section 107 as an owner and operator 
of a disposal facility and as an arranger of treatment and disposal of 
hazardous substances.281 The Special Master reasoned in Stringfellow 
that: 
Even if the State were considered an "involuntary" owner or 
operator of the facility (see § lOl(20)(D)) its liability is unaffected 
since the State caused and contributed to a release and threatened 
release of a hazardous substance from the facility both before and 
after it became the owner and operator, including but not limited 
to its negligence in (i) investigating the site, (ii) choosing the site, 
(iii) designing the site, (iv) supervising construction of the site, (v) 
delaying taking cleanup activities at the site and (vi) failing to 
remedy conditions at the site.282 
The court in New Castle County found, however, that several of the 
facts relied upon by the Special Master in Stringfellow to support his 
holdings were "conspicuously missing in the instant case."283 The first 
missing fact was that the state of Delaware did not have California's 
involvement in hiring, setting the responsibilities for, directing, and 
supervising the employees who had day-to-day operational responsi-
bility for the Stringfellow site.284 The court in New Castle County 
noted that such facts also were missing in Dart Industries285 and that 
United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656, 20,658 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 
6, 1989) (citing Rockwell Int'J Corp. v. UI Int'J Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 (N.D. Ill. 1988». 
278 New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 869. 
279 [d. 
280 See id. at 870; see also Stringfellow, No. CIV 83-2501 JMI(MX) Peetris, Special Master. 
Objections by the state of California to this order on directed verdict were overruled, and the 
order affirmed, in United States v. Stringfellow. See 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656. 
281 See New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 870. 
282 [d. (quoting Stringfellow, No. CIV 83-2501 JMI(MX) at 4-5 (emphasis added». 
283 See id. at 870. 
284 See id. 
286 United States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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the Fourth Circuit in Dart Industries considered the absence of such 
facts "important in determining the non-culpability of DHEC."286 
Other facts that New Castle County court found present in Stringfel-
low but absent in its case were: (1) the state of California made a 
public announcement that it was and would be responsible for the 
Stringfellow site;287 and (2) two state of California employees testified 
at trial that California "'directed' and 'controlled' the Stringfellow 
site.''288 The court concluded the section of its opinion dealing with the 
state's liability as an operator with the statement that "[u]nlike the 
Special Master's decision in Stringfellow, the actions taken by the 
State of Delaware at Tybouts Corner do not exceed 'mere regulation' 
nor do they constitute 'active, voluntary, "hands on" participation in 
the day-to-day management and operations' of the Site."289 Later, in 
the section of its decision dealing with the state's liability as an ar-
ranger under section l07(a)(3), the court added: 
It is not the fact that the state was regulating the sites that 
compels the Court's conclusions that the state was not a covered 
person under Sections 107(a)(2) and (3). Rather, the basis of these 
conclusions is that the level of the state's involvement at Tybouts 
Corner, which in this case was taken pursuant to its regulatory 
and statutory mandate, does not amount to sufficient activity to 
give rise to operator or arranger status under CERCLA.290 
286 New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 870 (citing Dart Indus., 847 F.2d at 146). "However, 
there is no allegation that DHEC went beyond the governmental supervision and directly 
managed Carolaum's employees or finances at the Fort Lawn site." Id. (quoting Dart Indus., 
847 F.2d at 146). New Castle County also compared Stringfellow with Edward Hines Lumber 
Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., which New Castle County described as affirming summary judg-
ment of no operator liability "where 'Hines has presented no evidence that Osmose ever ... 
exercised any control over the disposal of process run-off into the holding pond.'" New Castle 
County, 727 F. Supp. at 870 (quoting Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 
F. Supp. 651,657 (N.D. Ill. 1988), a/I'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988». "Osmose ... did not interfere 
with operational decisions .... Osmose had no control of the work at the Hines plant, no right 
to chose [sicl employees, [orl direct their activities .... " Id. (quoting Edward Hines Lumber 
Co., 861 F.2d at 158.) 
287 See New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 870. The court pointed out that "denial of respon-
sibility for the site lies at the core of the state's arguments." Id. 
288 See id. (citing Stringfellow NO. CIV 83-2501 JMI(MX) at 7). The court noted that there 
was "no positive statement by State officials that the state directed and controlled the Tybouts 
Comer site." Id. at 870. 
289 Id. (quoting Stringfellow, No. CIV. 83-2501 JMI(MX) at 7). 
290 United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 874-75 (D. Del. 1989). The court 
similarly stated that it "does not hold that a governmental body is automatically foreclosed from 
CERCLA liability merely because it is acting in a regulatory capacity pursuant to statutory 
mandate." Id. at 875. It added, in dictum, however, that "[ilf a state owned or operated a facility 
or deposited its own hazardous wastes at a facility it owned, the mere fact that it was also 
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As the preceding passage indicates, the New Castle County court 
also held that the state of Delaware's regulatory activities did not 
make it liable as an arranger under section 107(a)(3). The court first 
noted that neither CERCLA nor its legislative history defines the 
term "arrange," but asserted that "it is fairly well settled" that the 
term arrange in section 107(a)(3) "should be given a liberal interpre-
tation."291 The court in New Castle County reviewed the decision in 
City of Johnstown292 and found that decision's "reasoning ... to be 
persuasive."293 Agreeing with the reasoning in City of Johnstown, the 
court held "that to impose liability under section 107(a)(3) some nexus 
or relationship must be shown between the person alleged to be an 
arranger (here the State) and the owner of the hazardous sub-
stance."294 
The cases295 relied upon by the defendant in City of Johnstown were 
distinguished by the New Castle County court for the same reasons 
as they were distinguished in City of Johnstown, with the court 
stressing that there were no facts indicating that the state of Dela-
ware ever actually or constructively possessed any hazardous sub-
stances that were disposed of by another person at Tybouts Corner 
landfill, and that the attempt to hold the state liable under section 
. 107(a)(3) was based upon the state's actions in permitting or directing 
wastes to be deposited at Tybouts Corner landfill.296 The court then 
rejected the defendants' "final contention that the State should be 
held an arranger because it had the authority to control the disposal 
of the toxic substances."297 The court concluded that a finding that the 
state was liable as an arranger was not required by two decisions298 
of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon by the defendants 
operating in a regulatory capacity would not necessarily mean that it would escape liability 
under CERCLA." [d. 
291 See id. at 871. 
292 New York v. City of Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). 
293 New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 872. 
294 [d. at 872. Later in the opinion the court similarly stated "that in order to characterize a 
CERCLA person as an arranger there must be some nexus or relationship between the person 
under attack and the actual owner or possessor of the hazardous substance." [d. at 874. 
296 United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1306-07 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. A&F Materials Co., 
Inc., 582 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56,60 (D.N.H. 
1984). 
296 See New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 872. 
297 [d. at 873. 
298 See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); Northeastern 
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 726. 
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in support of this contention.299 The court in New Castle County 
reasoned that these two decisions are not inconsistent with its re-
quirement that there must be some nexus or relationship between the 
person alleged to be an arranger and the actual owner or possessor 
of the hazardous substance in order for the person to be liable as an 
arranger, because in those Eighth Circuit cases "this nexus or rela-
tionship was present due to the commercial relationship of the person 
fixed with arranger status (which in some instances was coupled with 
the actual control that person had over the hazardous wastes) and the 
hazardous wastes which were disposed."3°O 
The court concluded in New Castle County that the state of Dela-
ware should not be liable under section 107(a)(3) as an arranger be-
cause the state's attempts "to solve the problem of the safe disposal 
of wastes (-some of which may be determined to be hazardous ... ) 
is simply not an appropriate situation for the attachment of arranger 
status on the State."301 
'!\vo years after New Castle County was decided, Judge Broomfield, 
in Hassayampa Steering Committee v. State of Arizona, relied upon 
City of Johnstown and New Castle County to hold that the state of 
Arizona was not liable as an arranger under section 107(a)(3) as a 
result of its regulatory involvement with the disposal of hazardous 
wastes at a sanitary landfil1.302 The state in Hassayampa Steering 
Committee had arranged for a sanitary landfill to receive hazardous 
wastes for a limited period of time, notified transporters of the 
landfill's availability for such disposal, established a manifest and 
permit system to screen and track wastes going to the landfill, and 
assisted the landfill's owner in designing pits at the landfill to receive 
hazardous wastes. The court in Hassayampa Steering Committee 
equated the state's actions to the state's actions in City of Johnstown 
299 See New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 874. 
300 ld. The court also rejected an argument, based on the Special Master's decision in United 
States v. Stringfellow, see No. CIV 83-2501 JMI(MX) Peetris, Special Master (Order on Directed 
Verdict), that "arranger status can attach even to a person who did not own the waste and that 
it is the possession and exercise of 'the authority to take an active role in "arranging for" the 
disposal of wastes' that is relevant." New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 874 n.43. 
801 New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at 874. As noted earlier, the court also stated that the 
state was not being exempted from CERCLA liability "merely because it is acting in a regula-
tory capacity pursuant to statutory mandate," but rather was being held not to be an arranger 
under section 107(a)(3) because the state's involvement at Tybouts Corner, pursuant to its 
regulatory and statutory mandate, did not amount to sufficient activity to give rise to arranger 
liability. ld. at 874-75; see supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
802 Hassayampa Steering Comm. v. Arizona, 768 F. Supp. 697, 702 (D. Ariz. 1991). 
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and New Castle County, and held that the state of Arizona did not 
have a nexus with the actual owners of the hazardous wastes sent to 
the landfill, which the court held was necessary to establish that the 
state had the constructive ownership or possession of the wastes 
required to impose arranger liability.3°S Hassayampa Steering Com-
mittee emphasized that although the state gave waste owners permis-
sion through the manifest system to deposit hazardous wastes at the 
landfill, "[t]he State ... was not authorized by any of the actual waste 
owners to decide on the owner's behalf where and how the waste 
would be deposited."304 The court reasoned that because "the gener-
ators and transporters [could] not be said to have appointed the State 
to decide on their behalf where the hazardous waste would be depos-
ited, the State's relationship with the actual owners and depositors 
therefore was insufficient to establish that the State constructively 
owned or possessed the waste."305 The court alternatively could have 
argued on this basis that the state could not be held liable as an 
arranger because the state's lack of appointment to decide where the 
waste would be deposited meant that it could not have "otherwise 
arranged" for treatment or disposal of the waste (a requirement for 
liability under section 107(a)(3». 
In an earlier opinion involving the same landfill, Judge Broomfield, 
however, denied motions for summary judgment as to the state of 
Arizona's liability under section 107(a)(2) as an operator of the 
landfill.306 The court declined to hold that the state was an operator of 
the facility, concluding that a totality of circumstances approach was 
appropriate for deciding the issue of operator liability.so7 Although 
Judge Broomfield characterized the state's participation in hazardous 
waste disposal at the landfill as "pervasive," he noted that "many of 
those activities were regulatory in nature" and concluded that "plain-
tiffs have not presented sufficient evidence that the state controlled 
enough management activities for the court to determine on summary 
judgment, that the State was an operator, under CERCLA."308 
303 [d. at 702. The court in dictum suggested that such nexus "is usually evidenced by having 
the authority to decide on behalf of the owner where the waste could be deposited." [d. 
304 [d. at 701. 
306 [d. 
306 See Hassayampa Steering Comm. v. Arizona, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,549, 
20,555 (D. Ariz. 1990). 
3117 See id. at 20,554. 
BOB [d. 
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Although governmental entities should not be immune per se 
(through sovereign immunity) from liability under section 107 when 
the government is regulating other persons in a sovereign capacity,809 
governmental entities usually should not be held liable, either as 
operators of facilities or as arrangers of disposal or treatment, solely 
on the basis of governmental regulation of business or commercial 
activities of other persons (through requirements governing site lo-
cation, facility design, types of materials processed or wastes disposed 
of at a: facility, monitoring, reporting, permits, etc.). When a govern-
mental entity's only involvement with a facility is through such regu-
lation in the government's sovereign capacity and in furtherance of 
the general public interest, holding the government liable under 
CERCLA would not further CERCLA's purpose of imposing liability 
upon those persons who profit commercially from business activities 
relating to hazardous substances.310 However, if government regula-
tion of another person's facility becomes so intrusive (as in Stringfel-
low) that the government is actually controlling the day-to-day activi-
ties or finances of the facility, or deciding where hazardous substances 
shall be disposed of, the governmental entity may be held liable as a 
facility operator or as an arranger of disposal. But as City of 
Johnstown, Dart Industries and New Castle County illustrate, these 
standards for CERCLA liability for governmental regulatory activity 
rarely will result in governmental liability under CERCLA, and 
therefore should not impede governmental regulatory programs in 
promoting public health, safety, and welfare. 
F. Liability ofa Governmental Entity as a CERCLA PRP 
Through Involvement with Private Business Facilities 
As the cases discussed in this section indicate, the United States 
increasingly is being sued under sections 107 and 113(f) under the 
theory that the federal government's involvement with a private 
business facility makes it liable as an owner or operator of the facility 
or as an arranger of disposal of hazardous substances at the facility. 
Many of these cases are based upon the United States' involvement 
with private facilities that manufactured products or extracted mate-
309 See supra notes 39-51, 217-21 and accompanying text. 
310 See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text. 
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rials used by the United States in waging war during World War H3ll 
or the Vietnam War.3l2 
In some of these cases, the United States had entered into a con-
tract with the owner or operator of a private facility to have that 
facility produce a product or materials for the United States for use 
by the federal government in its war efforts,3l3 while in others the 
United States directed and assisted a private manufacturing facility 
to produce a particular product or material needed for a war effort 
(without the federal government having contracted to purchase the 
materials or products produced by the facility.)3l4 Although these 
cases have dealt only with the liability of the United States under 
CERCLA in such circumstances, the holdings in these cases should 
apply equally to a state or local government in similar circumstances 
because CERCLA's waivers of sovereign immunity essentially are 
the same for federal, state, and local governments.3l5 
In the leading case of FMC Corp. v. United States Department of 
Commerce, a majority of the en banc Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's holdings that the United States was li-
able under section 107 as the operator of a private industrial facility 
(owned and operated by American Viscose Corporation) at Front 
Royal, Virginia.3l6 This facility had produced high-tenacity rayon (a 
substitute for natural rubber) during World War H under the direc-
tion and assistance of the federal government for the war effort. The 
Third Circuit in FMC Corp., without discussion, because the court 
was equally divided on the issue, also affirmed the district court's 
holding that the United States was liable under section 107(a)(3) as 
3ll See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 834 (3d Cir. 1994); Elf 
Atochem North America v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1996); East Bay 
Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 43 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1918, 1921 
(D.D.C. 1996); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1435 (E.D. Cal. 
1995); see also Van S. Katzman, Note, The Waste of War: Government CERCLA Liability at 
World War II Facilities, 79 VA. L. REV. 1191 (1993). 
312 See United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 1995); Maxus Energy 
Corp. v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 399, 402 (N.D. Tex. 1995). 
313 See, e.g., Venac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d at 806; Elf Atochem North America, 914 F. Supp. at 
1168; East Bay, 43 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1921; Maxus Energy Corp., 898 F. Supp. at 402; 
Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1435. 
314 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 836-38 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(en bane). 
315 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,9-10 (1989). 
316 FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 845. 
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an arranger for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at 
the facility.317 
In FMC Corp., the majority rejected the federal government's 
argument that its involvement with the facility during World War II 
was regulatory activity for which the federal government is per se 
immune from liability under section 107, holding that "the [federal] 
government can be liable when it engages in regulatory activities 
extensive enough to make it an operator of a facility or an arranger 
of the disposal of hazardous wastes even though no private party 
could engage in the regulatory activities at issue."31s The court also 
held that it would "consider both the government's regulatory and 
non-regulatory activities with respect to the facility during the war 
and determine whether these activities taken in toto were of the type 
commonly associated with being an operator or arranger under CER-
CLA and are the type of activities in which private parties could 
engage."319 
After noting that "the definition of 'operator' in CERCLA gives 
little guidance to the courts in determining if a particular person or 
entity is liable as an operator because the statute circularly defines 
'operator' as 'any person ... operating such facility,"'320 the majority 
of the Third Circuit in FMC Corp. relied321 upon the "actual control" 
test which it previously had used322 to determine whether operator 
liability should be imposed upon one corporation for the acts of a 
related corporation. Under this actual control test, a corporation is 
held liable for the environmental violations of another corporation if 
it exercises actual and substantial control over "'the corporation's 
day-to-day operations and its policy making decisions."'323 After re-
viewing the record in the case and applying this actual control test to 
the facts of the case, the majority in FMC Corp. concluded that the 
federal government was an operator of the facility under section 107 
because it had had "substantial control" over the facility and "active 
involvement in the activities" there.324 The court's reasoning was that: 
317 [d. at 846. 
318 [d. at 840. 
319 [d. at 842. 
320 [d. at 843. 
321 FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
322 Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. 'lbnolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993). 
323 FMC Carp., 29 F.3d at 843 (quoting Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F.3d at 1222). 
324 [d. at 843. 
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The government determined what product the facility would 
manufacture, controlled the supply and price of the facility's raw 
materials, in part by building or causing plants to be built near 
the facility for their production, supplied equipment for use in the 
manufacturing process, acted to ensure that the facility retained 
an adequate labor force, participated in the management and 
supervision of the labor force, had the authority to remove work-
ers who were incompetent or guilty of misconduct, controlled the 
price of the facility's product, and controlled who could purchase 
the product .... In particular, the government cannot reasonably 
quarrel with the conclusion that leading indicia of control were 
present, as the government determined what product the facility 
would produce, the level of production, the price of the product 
and to whom the product would be sold.325 
After stating that "none of these factors is dispositive, and each is 
important only to the extent it is evidence of substantial, actual con-
trol,"326 the majority in FMC Corp. discussed several decisions in 
which courts had decided whether a person was an operator under 
section 107 by considering factors similar to those it considered under 
what it referred to as "the totality of the circumstances presented" 
approach.327 
The majority in FMC Corp., however, distinguished Dart Indus-
tries328 and New Castle County329 on the grounds that "in neither case 
did the governmental entity implicated have the control that the 
federal government exercised at Front Royal, and in neither case was 
the governmental entity involved in the facility for the purpose of 
obtaining a product for its own use."330 The majority in FMC Corp. 
added that "although the government officials and employees person-
ally did not take over the plant, the government maintained a sig-
nificant degree of control over the production process through regu-
lations, on-site inspectors, and the possibility of seizure."331 Taking 
into consideration the totality of circumstances, "this degree of con-
trol, and given the fact that the wastes would not have been created 
325 [d. 
326 [d. 
327 See id. at 845 (citing Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., No. 83-C-2385, 1987 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 
14254, at *3-*4 (D. Colo. Apr. 29, 1987). 
328 See United States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). 
329 See United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989). 
330 FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 844 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
331 [d. The majority noted that the federal government was involved with the facility as a 
whole, not just with government-owned equipment and machinery that were used in the 
production process at the Fort Royal facility. See id. at 845. 
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if not for the government's activities," the majority in FMC Corp. held 
that the federal government was liable as an operator under CER-
CLA.S32 
Chief Judge Sloviter of the Third Circuit argued in dissent in FMC 
Corp. that Congress had not waived the federal government's sover-
eign immunity for the government's activities involved in the case, 
and that the "quantum and nature of the government's activities set 
forth on this record do not rise to the statutory 'operator' and 'ar-
ranger' level."333 Judge Sloviter asserted that: 
it is factually incolTect to give the impression that the govern-
ment was supervising operating personnel at the American Vis-
832 [d. at 844-45. The majority of the Third Circuit added that it could not "reject the district 
court's 'inherently fact-intensive' conclusion that the government was an operator of the facil-
ity." [d. at 845 (quoting Lansford-Coaldale, Joint Water Auth. v. Thnolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 
1222 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow Chern. Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3081, *64-68 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding United States liable as an operator under section 
107(a) of plants that produced chemicals for United States under contract, because United 
States had authority to control the cause of contamination at time hazardous substances were 
released into environment, and substantial control over the plants operations). The court in 
FMC Corp. also affirmed the district court's judgment that the United States was liable as an 
arranger under section 107(a)(3) without discussion because the en banc panel of the Third 
Circuit was equally divided on this issue. See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 
29 F.3d 833, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). Judge Greenberg, in his earlier, subsequently 
vacated opinion for a three judge panel in FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Com-
merce, had relied upon United States v. Aceto Agricultural Corp. to hold that the United States 
was liable under section 107(a)(3) as an arranger for disposal of hazardous substances at the 
Front Royal facility. See FMC Corp., 37 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1689, 1697 (3d Cir. 1993), 
withdrawn and opinion and judgment vacated upon granting of en banc hearing, 10 F.3d 987 
(3d Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Aceto Agric. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379--82 (8th Cir. 1989». 
Judge Greenberg had argued that the federal government was liable under Aceto as an arranger 
because it supplied some of the raw materials to the facility's owner, effectively owned the high 
tenacity nylon as it was being produced at the facility and as a final product, and knew that the 
generation of hazardous substances was inherent in the facility's production process. See FMC 
Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 37 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1689, 1697 (3d Cir. 1993); 
see also Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chern. Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3081, *69 
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding United States liable as an "arranger" under section 107(a)(3) of 
CERCLA "because of its ownership of all of the materials used and generated at the plants 
[operated by Dow Chemical Co.], its concession that waste generation was inherent in the 
styrene plant operations, and its specific ordering of waste or by-product transfers between the 
Copolymer Plant and the Styrene Plant by its agent operators for treatment"). 
Judge Sloviter, dissenting from Judge Greenberg's majority decision for the three judge 
panel, argued that Judge Greenberg had misapplied Aceto because the federal government did 
not own the raw materials processed by the facility of the final product, and only facilitated the 
availability to the facility of the necessary raw products (which Judge Sloviter argued was 
insufficient for arranger liability). See FMC Corp., 37 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1702--00 
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). 
888 FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 846 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). 
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cose plant or had an input in the firing or retention of American 
Viscose's employees. . . . While government officials were con-
cerned about the activities at the plant, their actions were in 
response to American Viscose's requests for assistance rather 
than part of any overarching scheme to control the workings of 
the plant.334 
Moreover, Judge Sloviter argued that government price controls dur-
ing World War II were not "the involvement in day-to-day manage-
ment decisions" necessary for operator liability.335 In addition, Judge 
Sloviter suggested that American Viscose, the owner of the facility 
during World War II, should be liable under section 107, instead of 
the federal government.336 The judge reasoned that because FMC 
failed to produce evidence that American Viscose did not make an 
adequate profit from its World War II production, American Viscose 
should pay for the "cleanup costs as part of the cost of initial produc-
tion."337 
The approach followed by FMC Corp. therefore determines the 
liability of a governmental entity under section 107, as a result of 
governmental involvement with a private business facility that pro-
duced a product or materials under government contact, direction, or 
assistance, on a case-by-case basis through application of the stand-
ards usually used by a court to determine operator or arranger liabil-
ity. While the Third Circuit suggested in FMC Corp. that a different 
holding might have been reached if the federal government had been 
concerned only with its equipment and machinery or had acted as "an 
ordinary purchaser of a product from a manufacturer," the court 
found that it could not say that the government's activities at the 
facility were limited to government-owned equipment and machinery 
when the government's overriding concern was the efficient operation 
of the facility as a whole.338 
Distinguishing FMC Corp., other courts have held that the federal 
government is not liable under section 107, either as an operator of a 
privately owned facility or as an arranger for disposal at the facility, 
334 [d. at 853. 
335 [d. at 854. 
336 See id. 
837 See id. 
838 See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 845 (3d Cir. 1994) (en 
banc); see also Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 1166, 1169-70 
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that United States can be held liable under section 107 as owner of 
equipment from which there was a release of a hazardous substance). 
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where the government acted merely as a purchaser of a product 
manufactured and sold by the facility.339 In United States v. Venac 
Chemical, the Eighth Circuit, following the Third Circuit's analysis 
in FMC Corp., held that based on a "fact-intensive inquiry and the 
. totality of circumstances," the United States was not liable as an 
operator.340 The court reasoned that the United States did not "exer-
cise actual or substantial control over the operations" at a privately 
owned factory that contracted with the United States to produce the 
herbicide Agent Orange during the Vietnam War.341 The Eighth Cir-
cuit found in Venac Chemical that a "key fact" in FMC Corp. for 
determining operator liability was that the federal government or-
dered American Viscose, the owner of the facility, to convert its 
facility to production of high-tenacity rayon, a process which gener-
ated hazardous substances that were disposed of on-site.342 In Venac 
Chemical, however, Hercules, Inc., the owner of the facility, bid for 
the federal government's Agent Orange contract, and made its own 
decision to change its operations to produce Agent Orange.343 The 
court in Venac Chemical also stressed that another important fact in 
FMC Corp. was that the United States "exerted considerable day-to-
day control over American Viscose."344 By contrast, the court found 
that the United States did not exert day-to-day control over Hercules, 
Inc., and was therefore not liable as an operator.346 The court held that 
the United States did not exert control, because "no representative 
of the United States ever managed or supervised any Hercules per-
sonnel during the relevant time period."346 Moreover, the court stated 
that: 
[T]he United States was never actively involved on a regular 
basis in, and thus never exerted substantial control over, opera-
tions at the Jacksonville facility while Hercules was producing 
Agent Orange. Moreover, the facts that Hercules was required to 
comply with the worker health and safety regulations under the 
Walsh-Healey Act, and that on two occasions inspectors visited 
839 See United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 800, 809--11 (8th Cir. 1995), em. denied 
515 U.S. 1158 (1995); Maxus Energy Corp. v. United States 898 F. Supp. 399,407-4>8 (N.D. Tex. 
1995); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1449--52 (E.D. Cal 1995). 
340 See Venae Chem. Carp., 46 F.3d at 808. 
341 See id. 
342 See id. at 809. 
343 [d. 
344 See id. (quoting FMC Carp., 29 F.3d at 844). 
346 See United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 800, 809 (8th Cir. 1995). 
346 See Venae Chem. Carp., 46 F.3d at 809. 
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the Jacksonville plant to investigate such compliance, are in-
sufficient bases for imposing CERCLA liability on the United 
States as an operator of the facility.347 
Furthermore, the court in Vertac Chemical held that the United 
States was not liable as an arranger for disposal of hazardous sub-
stances at the Hercules, Inc., facility.348 The Eighth Circuit reasoned 
that the United States could not be an arranger because it did not 
have the authority to control the hazardous substances that were 
disposed of, which the court viewed as necessary to satisfy section 
107(a)(3)'s constructive possession element.349 The fact that the United 
States had "statutory or regulatory authority to control activities 
which involved the production, treatment or disposal of hazardous 
substances was not sufficient to subject the United States to liability 
under section l07(a)(3)."350 
In addition, the buyer-seller relationship between the United 
States and Hercules, Inc., was held to be an insufficient basis to make 
the United States liable under section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA, even 
though the United States had the power to require Hercules, Inc., to 
perform the contract and to give it priority over its other contracts.351 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Hercules, Inc., had actively sought 
the Agent Orange contracts, had made a profit on the contracts, and 
"was given opportunities to negotiate some terms of the contract 
specifications and, as a result, some of those terms were changed or 
modified."352 Referring to the Third Circuit's holding in FMC Corp. 
that the federal government was liable as an arranger, the court in 
Vertac Chemical stated in dictum "that circumstances may exist 
where a government contract involves sufficient coercion or govern-
mental regulation and intervention to justify the United States' liabil-
ity as an arranger under CERCLA," but concluded that "the undis-
puted facts in the present case do not support such a finding."353 
Finally, the Vertac Chemical court rejected the appellants' argu-
ment that the United States was subject to arranger liability under 
United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemical.354 The Vertac Chemical 
347 [d. 
348 See id. at 810-11. 
349 See id. at 810. 
360 [d. at 810. 
361 United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 810-11 (8th Cir. 1995). 
362 [d. at 811. 
363 [d. 
364 See id. (citing Auto v. United States, 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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court distinguished Aceto Agricultural Chemical on the grounds that 
in its case the United States did not supply the raw materials to 
Hercules, Inc., and did not own or possess the raw materials as the 
work in process.3OO 
Maxus Energy Corp. v. United States followed this holding in Ver-
tac Chemical and held that under Aceto Agricultural Chemical the 
United States could not be held liable as an arranger for disposal of 
hazardous substances at a privately owned facility that produced the 
herbicide Agent Orange under a contract with the United States.356 
The court in Maxus Energy Corp. held that Aceto Agricultural 
Chemical was not controlling in its case because the relationship 
between the United States and Diamond Alkali Co., the owner-op-
erator of the facility, was that of buyer-seller, not manufacturer-
formulator as in Aceto Agricultural Chemical.357 Therefore, two ele-
ments of Aceto Agricultural Chemical were not satisfied because the 
United States "never owned the raw materials manufactured into 
Agent Orange" and therefore "could not have retained ownership of 
hazardous substances throughout the manufacturing process .... "356 
The Maxus Energy Corp. court also held, on the basis of Vertac 
Chemical's actual control test, that the United States was not liable 
as an operator of the facility in question, because 
the United States did not specify any particular production proc-
ess to be used in manufacturing herbicides pursuant to the con-
tracts. United States personnel did not hire, fire, discipline, or 
manage any Diamond personnel working in the herbicide produc-
tion process at the Newark Plant, and did not control or partici-
pate in Diamond's waste disposal activities. Diamond personnel, 
who directed the manner of disposal of wastes at the Newark 
Plant, did not consult United States personnel regarding such 
waste disposa1.359 
300 See id. 
356 See Maxus Energy Corp. v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 399, 407 (N.D. Tex. 1995). 
357 See id. at 406, 408. 
358 I d. at 407. 
359 Id. at 408. The court in Maxus Energy Corp. also rejected the alternative argument that 
the United States should be held liable as an operator under the "authority to control" test. See 
id. This test was applied in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th 
Cir 1992). See supra note 189 and accompanying text. The court reasoned that under the facts 
of the case, the United States had not been shown to have the authority to control the facility's 
operations or decisions involving the disposal of hazardous substances at the facility. See Maxus 
Energy Corp. v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 399, 408 (N.D. Tex. 1995). Finally, the court in 
Maxus Energy Corp., followed the holding in Vertac Chemical Corp. that the United States' 
regulation of the facility under the Walsh-Healey Act and the Defense Production Act of 1950 
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Under FMC Corp., Vertac Chemical, and Maxus Energy Corp., a 
governmental entity will not be liable under section 107, either as an 
operator of a facility or as an arranger of disposal of hazardous sub-
stances at a facility, solely because the government, through a con-
tract or the exercise of regulatory authority, has a privately owned 
facility produce materials for purchase and use by the governmental 
entity (or for purchase and use by other persons as part of a govern-
mental program). Such activity by a governmental entity would not 
satisfy any of the tests used to determine operator and arranger 
liability under CERCLA, unless the government actually controls, or 
acquires the authority to control, day-to-day operations and manage-
ment of the facility and disposal of hazardous substances generated 
at the facility. However, when a governmental entity becomes as 
involved in day-to-day operations and management of a privately 
owned facility as the United States was involved in FMC Corp., that 
a governmental entity may be held liable under section 107 as an 
operator of the facility or as an arranger of disposal of hazardous 
substances at the facility. A governmental entity will not become 
liable when it merely purchases a product or materials from a pri-
vately owned facility. However, future decisions will have to deter-
mine if all of the activities in which the United States engaged in FMC 
Corp. must be present in order to hold a governmental entity liable 
on the basis of governmental involvement with a private business 
facility, or whether CERCLA operator or arranger liability can be 
imposed when some, but not all, of the United States' activities in 
FMC Corp. are present in a particular case. 
was not a sufficient basis for finding the level of control by the United States over the facility 
necessary to impose liability as an operator under CERCLA. See id. 
In United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., and East Bay Municipal Utility District v. 
United States Department of Commerce, the courts distinguished FMC Corp., and held that 
the United States was liable, neither as an operator of a facility nor as an arranger of disposal, 
because the United States, pursuant to a contract, only purchased materials produced by a 
privately owned facility and encouraged and regulated the production of the materials, and was 
not involved in ''hands-on,'' day-to-day management or operation of the facility. See United 
States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1449-51 (E.D. Cal. 1995); see also East 
Bay Mun. Uti!. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 43 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1918 
(D. D.C. 1996). The court in East Bay Municipal Utility District held that the United States 
did not become liable as an operator of a privately owned facility simply because government 
policies were the reason why the facility produced a partiCUlar product during World War II, 
or because government financing and price subsidies helped the private facility to stay in 
business during the war. See East Bay, 43 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1927, 1930. 
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G. Governmental Liability as a PRP as a Result of Cleanup 
Activities 
Almost uniformly, courts have held that neither a state nor the 
federal government can be held liable under either section 107 or 
section 113(f) solely on the basis of government cleanup actions, re-
sponding to or remediating the release or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance under CERCLA360 or under other authority.361 
Most of these decisions have based their holding of governmental 
non-liability upon a finding that Congress under CERCLA has not 
waived state and federal government sovereign immunity for EPA 
and state cleanup activities,362 although some (as an alternative hold-
ing) also have held that such governmental cleanup activities are not 
sufficient to make the government liable as an operator of a facility 
or as an arranger of disposal.363 Alternatively, a court may hold that 
360 See FMC Corp. v United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating 
in dictum that federal, "state and local governments are immune from CERCLA liability for 
the consequence of cleanup activities in response to emergencies created by others .... "); see 
also United States v. Cordova Chern. Co., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. American 
Color & Chern., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 445, 449-50 (M.D. Pa. 1994), counterclaims dismissed, 885 F. 
Supp. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Auto-Ion Litig. Group v. Auto Ion Chern., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 328, 
331-S2 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Stilloe v. Almy Bros., 782 F. Supp. 731,736 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); United 
States v. Atlas Minerals & Chern., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 420--421 (E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Paoli R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 790 F. Supp. 94, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aJJ'd, 980 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Shaner, Civ. A. No. 85-1372, 1992 WL 154652, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1992); United States v. 
Western Processing, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 725, 730 (W.D. Wash. 1991); United States v. Azrael, 765 
F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (D. Md. 1991), motions to dismiss denied, 774 F. Supp. 376 (D. Md. 1991); 
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 577-78 (W.D. Mich. 1991), aJJ'd in part 
and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Hardage, 32 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1059, 1061 (W.D. Okla. 1989); B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 633 F. 
Supp. 1290, 1296 n.9 (D. Utah 1986). 
361 See United States v. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (federal government 
not subject to contribution counterclaim under section 113(f) on the basis of response actions 
undertaken pursuant to section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, prior to the 
enactment of CERCLA); United States v. Berks Assoc., Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-4868, 1992 WL 
68346, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (same holding as in Skipper). But see Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 
881 F. Supp. at 1447 (holding that governmental entities are not immune from liability under 
section 107 for improper or negligent cleanup activities undertaken in a regulatory or remedial 
capacity to clean up pollutants not generated by the government on non-governmental prop-
erty). 
362 See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 841; American Color & Chem. 858 F. Supp. at 449-50; Auto-Ion 
Litig. Group, 910 F. Supp. at 332; Stilloe, 782 F. Supp. at 736; Atlas Minerals & Chem., 797 F. 
Supp. at 420; In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 790 F. Supp. at 96; Shaner, 1992 WL 154652 at 
*3-*5; Berks Assoc., 1992 WL 68346 at *3; Western Processing, 761 F. Supp. at 728; Azrael, 765 
F. Supp. at 1244-46; Skipper, 781 F. Supp. at 1111-12; Hardage, 32 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 
1061; B.R. MacKay & Sons, 633 F. Supp. at 1296 n.9. 
363 See In re Paoli R. Yard PBC Litig., 790 F. Supp. at 97; Stilloe, 782 F. Supp. at 736; CPC 
Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 577-78; Western Processing, 761 F. Supp. at 730-S1. 
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a governmental entity is not subject to liability for its cleanup activi-
ties because such activities are immunized from liability by section 
107(d)(1)364 or section 107(d)(2),365 without having to reach the question 
of whether CERCLA waives governmental sovereign immunity for 
cleanup activities or whether governmental cleanup activities are 
sufficient for operator or arranger liability. 
As discussed below, various reasons have been given by courts in 
support of their holdings that governmental cleanup activities are not 
subject to liability under section 107. The reason that one court gave 
for holding that the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity 
under section 120366 "does not extend to response or remedial actions 
undertaken by the EPA is that, when the EPA undertakes such 
actions, it is not acting like a private party; it is acting to ameliorate 
a dangerous situation that, but for the prior actions of generators and 
transporters of the hazardous waste, would not exist."367 Because 
CERCLA's waiver of sovereign immunity in section 101(20)(D)368 for 
state and local governments is "virtually identical" to section 120's 
waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity,369 this argu-
ment is equally applicable to state and local government response or 
remedial cleanup actions. 
Exemption of governmental cleanup actions from CERCLA liabil-
ity also has been supported by arguments that "allowing contribution 
counterclaims [against a governmental entity that has brought a suit 
under section 107] . . . would undermine Congress' intent to ensure 
that those who benefit financially from a commercial activity should 
internalize the health and environmental costs of that activity into the 
costs of doing business . . . [and] would conflict with the primary 
objective of CERCLA, which is to ensure prompt cleanups;"37o and 
"would also contravene the Congressional intent to impose strict li-
ability under CERCLA, subject only to the defenses set forth in 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(b)."371 This latter argument apparently is premised 
upon a view that permitting a defendant, in an action brought by the 
state or federal government under section 107 to recover governmen-
364 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(I) (1994). 
366 [d. § 9607(d)(2); see supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. 
366 42 U.S.C. § 9620. 
367 Atlas Minerals & Chem., 797 F. Supp. at 421. 
368 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D). 
369 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). 
370 United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D. Md. 1991), motions to dismiss denied, 
774 F. Supp. 376 (D. Md. 1991). 
371 Atlas Minerals & Chem., 797 F. Supp. at 421 n.20. 
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tal response costs, to bring a contribution counterclaim against the 
plaintiff governmental entity on the basis of the governmental re-
sponse actions, would in effect constitute a defense because the result 
of such governmental liability would be to reduce the damages for 
which the defendant is liable (because the defendant's counterclaim 
would offset and reduce the response costs recovered by the plaintiff 
governmental entity from the defendant). This argument, however, 
confuses the issue of what constitutes an affirmative defense to liabil-
ity under section 107 (thus leading to no CERCLA liability at all on 
the part of a defendant) with the issue of when a plaintiff governmen-
tal entity in an action under section 107 is subject to liability itself 
when the defendant brings a contribution counterclaim against the 
plaintiff under section 113(f) (thus reducing the defendant's liability 
to the governmental plaintiff by the amount of the defendant's suc-
cessful contribution counterclaim against the plaintiff). 
The provisions of section 107(d),372 which exempt certain govern-
mental cleanup activities from liability under section 107, also have 
been found to "demonstrate that Congress did not intend to subject 
states and the [Federal] Government to liability under section 107 for 
their actions during cleanups,"373 although this argument ignores the 
fact that sections 107(d)(1) and 107(d)(2) only immunize certain gov-
ernmental cleanup activities-those consistent with the NCP (section 
107(d)(1) and those by state and local governments (but not the fed-
eral government) in response to an emergency (section 107(d)(2».374 
A governmental entity generally has been held to be immune from 
liability under section 107 for governmental cleanup activities even 
when such cleanup activities have been conducted in a manner incon-
372 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d). See supra notes 86-108 and accompanying text. 
373 Azrael, 765 F. Supp. at 1245. Azrael also incongruously stated that including the federal 
government or a state "within the scope of Section 107 when it performs cleanups of hazardous 
waste sites is also inconsistent with Congress' intent to address complaints such as those 
asserted in defendants' counterclaims [based upon EPA and the states carrying out their 
responsibilities under CERCLA and state law to clean up hazardous waste sites] as defenses 
to a cost recovery action under Section 107(d)." [d. Contrary to the court's statement, however, 
section 107(d)'s defenses will be invoked by governmental entities who are sued under section 
107 on the basis of their cleanup activities, not by persons sued under section 107 by the 
government to recover governmental response cost. The provisions in section 107(d)(1) and 
(d)(2) concerning liability for negligence have been interpreted by these courts as "not an 
authorization for litigation against the United States, but [as] merely clariftying] Congress' 
intent that the CERCLA remedial scheme not be viewed as occupying the field to the exclusion 
of tort claims." United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 761 F. Supp. 725, 729 (W.D. Wash. 
1991). 
374 See supra notes 86-108 and accompanying text. 
1997] GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 111 
sistent with the NCP or otherwise have been conducted in an im-
proper or negligent manner or in a manner that released additional 
hazardous substances.375 In addition to basing such holdings on the 
previously stated reasons in support of immunity of governmental 
cleanup activities from liability, these courts also have supported 
immunity for even improper governmental cleanup activities upon 
Congress' rejection of a proposed amendment to section 107 that 
would have added governmental misconduct and negligence as a sepa-
rate defense to CERCLA liability;376 and upon the provision in section 
107(a)(4)377 denying federal and state governments recovery of re-
sponse costs that are not consistent with the NCP.378 This former 
argument, relying upon Congress' rejection of a governmental mis-
conduct defense under section 107, however, also confuses the issue 
of what constitutes an affirmative defense in a suit under section 107, 
with a governmental plaintiff's liability under a section 113(0 coun-
terclaim. The latter argument, based upon section 107(a)(4)'s limita-
tion on governmental recovery of response costs, takes the position 
that section 107(a)( 4)'s limitation on recoverable damages is the only 
remedy available to a PRP when a governmental entity acted incon-
sistent with the NCP or otherwise acted improperly in conducting 
cleanup activities.379 
United States v. Iron Mountain Mines rejected each of the various 
reasons that have been given in support of immunizing governmental 
876 See In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 790 F. Supp. 94, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, 980 F.2d 724 
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106, 1113, 1115 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Azrael, 
765 F. Supp. at 1239; Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. at 729-30. These cases held that the 
United States was immune from liability under section 107 even for improper cleanup activities. 
The courts in United States v. Azrael and Stilloe v. Almy Brothers held that states are immune 
under section 107 even for improper cleanup activities. Stilloe v. Almy Bros., 782 F. Supp. 731, 
736 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Azrael, 765 F. Supp. at 1245. But see In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 790 
F. Supp. at 97 (holding alternatively that even improper governmental cleanup activities are 
insufficient for operator liability under section 107); Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. at 731 
(holding alternatively that even improper governmental cleanup activities are insufficient for 
operator liability under section 107). The court in Stilloe held that arranger liability under 
section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA could not be based solely upon governmental attempts at reme-
diation of hazardous waste problems at a site. Stilloe, 759 F. Supp. at 99, n.2; see also CPC Int'l, 
Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 577-79 (W.D. Mich. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd 
in part sub nom.; United States v. Cordova Chern. Co., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
even improper governmental cleanup activities were insufficient for arranger liability under 
section 107(a)(3) or operator liability under section 107(a)(2». 
376 See Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. at 729. 
317 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994). 
878 See Skipper, 781 F. Supp. at 1111-12. 
379 See id.; see also infra notes 426--87 and accompanying text. 
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cleanup activities from liability, however, and held that governmental 
entities are not immune from liability under section 107 for improper 
or negligent activities, undertaken in a regulatory or remedial capac-
ity, to clean up pollutants not generated by the government and not 
located on government property.380 The position of the court in Iron 
Mountain Mines is that a governmental entity is liable under section 
107 when the entity's "regulatory" or "remedial" activities, of what-
ever nature, bring the entity within the definition of the terms owner, 
operator, arranger, or transporter under section 107 (as those terms 
are applied to private parties).381 The federal and state governments 
argued that governmental cleanup activities should receive general 
immunity under section 107 "because private parties do not clean up 
pollution caused by others while governmental bodies will step for-
ward in such circumstances,'I382 but the court in Iron Mountain Mines 
held that: 
[T]his is an unconvincing rationale because CERCLA does en-
courage private cleanup of pollution caused by others by exposing 
current owners to liability and at the same time providing them 
with a cause of action for recovery of their costs .... In many 
instances private remediators will be CUITent owners of property 
who had nothing to do with the creation of the hazardous waste 
problem that they must respond to. These private parties are not 
different in any respect from a government agency acting in a 
remedial capacity and CERCLA does not acknowledge such a 
difference but treats them in the same way.383 
The government's argument, that it should be exempt from liability 
under CERCLA for regulatory/remedial actions that negligently re-
lease pollution because imposition of such liability "on governmental 
880 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1442 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
In Iron Mountain Mines, the federal government and the state of California sued the past and 
present owners of a mine under section 107 to recover response costs they incurred in cleanup 
activities related to acid mine drainage from the mine into streams and a river. Id. at 1434--35. 
One of the defendants filed counterclaims and third-party claims against the United States and 
California, alleging in part that the federal and state governments were liable under section 107 
as operators of dams and a power plant which allegedly contributed to the pollution problem 
addressed by the governmental response actions. See id. at 1434-35 n.3. The court denied the 
federal and state governments' motions to dismiss the counterclaims on grounds of immunity 
for governmental regulatory or remedial actions. See id. at 1442. 
881 See id. at 1448; see also FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 840 
(3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("when the government engages in activities that would make a private 
party liable if the private party engaged in those activities, then the government is also liable"). 
882 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1445 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
883 Id. (citations omitted). 
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entities responsible for releasing pollution would shift the cost of the 
cleanup to the government and thus would thwart 'Congress' intent 
to ensure that those who benefit financially from a commercial activity 
should internalize the health and environmental costs of the activity 
into the costs of doing business,"'384 also was rejected by the court in 
Iron Mountain Mines because: 
One may doubt that this statement accurately expresses the prin-
cipal purpose of CERCLA. If CERCLA can be said to have a 
central purpose, that purpose is to achieve cleanup. In doing so 
CERCLA may impose liability on parties who had little culpabil-
ity in creating the contamination problem at issue. This is fre-
quently the case when a later owner becomes responsible for 
pollution released many years earlier, sometimes under different 
technology and under different industrial standards. There is no 
question that CERCLA places liability on new owners, but it does 
not work to internalize the costs of pollution into current opera-
tions in these situations. Indeed, there may be no current business 
operations, yet the current landowner will be liable. More impor-
tantly, even if it is critical to make polluters internalize the costs 
of their harmful activities, it does not follow that they should also 
internalize the costs of the government's negligent response dur-
ing its cleanup efforts.385 
The court in Iron Mountain Mines, stating that Congress in CER-
CLA had resolved these complex policy questions and that courts 
should not follow another view,386 concluded their rejection of this 
government's argument by stating that "apparently" the Third Cir-
cuit in FMC Corp.,387 "could marshall no reason to uphold the remedial 
cases [immunizing governmental remedial cleanup activities from li-
ability under section 107] other than its feeling that they reached the 
right policy result."388 
The Iron Mountain Mines court also rejected the argument that 
Congress intended challenges to the adequacy of governmental reme-
dial activities to be addressed exclusively under section 107(a)(4) in a 
determination of consistency with the National Contingency Plan.389 
384 See id. (quoting United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D. Md. 1991)). 
385 [d. at 1445-46. 
386 See id. at 1446. 
387 FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 1994). 
388 United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1446 n.17 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
389 See id. at 1446. If this argument was accepted, a defendant in a suit brought by a govern-
mental entity under section 107 to recover governmental response costs could not bring a 
contribution counterclaim under section 113(0(1) of CERCLA against the governmental plain-
tiff on the basis of negligent governmental cleanup activities. See id. 
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This approach was criticized by the court on the ground that under 
this approach it is possible or "even likely" that a landowner may have 
to bear the costs of earlier government cleanup actions inconsistent 
with the NCP if the landowner itself subsequently "cleaned up the 
site as CERCLA encourages," but is unable to hold the government 
liable under section 107 on the basis of the government's improper 
cleanup actions.3OO 
The argument that permitting a claim under sections 107 or 113(0 
"for governmental negligence at a cleanup site would be tantamount 
to creating a 'new negligence defense' to CERCLA liability when the 
government seeks to recover cleanup costs" also was rejected by the 
court in Iron Mountain Mines.39! The court noted that section 113(j)392 
"expressly provides that the government's choice of remedies can be 
challenged when it seeks to recover cleanup costs," and, "further, 
[that] a claim against another responsible party is not fairly viewed 
as a defense, certainly not when CERCLA provides for contribution 
and does not deem one responsible party's effort to gain contribution 
in any sense as a defense."393 Turning the tables on the government, 
the court added that granting immunity to governmental cleanup 
activities "itself is a new defense to governmental liability, one not 
provided by the statute."394 
The Iron Mountain Mines court also rejected the argument that 
Congress' failure to enact an amendment to CERCLA proposed by 
Senator Helms, which would have added a governmental miscon-
duct/negligence defense to section 107, indicates "that Congress did 
not intend that governmental agencies would be liable for their reme-
dial activities."396 The court rejected this argument on the grounds 
that: 
890 See id. The court failed, in this argument, to mention the possibility that the landowner 
might have an action under state tort law (or CERCLA) against the government pursuant to 
section 107(d)(1) or section 107(d)(2) for costs or damages resulting from the government's 
negligence or gross negligence. Of course, a landowner might prefer section 107's strict liability 
standard to a negligence or gross negligence standard. The court in Iron Mountain Mines did 
discuss section 107(d) later in its opinion, interpreting the section as providing for liability under 
CERCLA (not state tort law) for governmental negligence in cleanup activities and citing 
section 107(d) in support of its holding that CERCLA does not provide absolute immunity for 
governmental cleanup activities. 
391 See id. at 1446. 
392 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j) (1994). 
893 United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1446-47 (E.n. Cal. 1995). 
894 See id. at 1447. 
896 See id. at 1448. 
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This argument confuses rejection of a defense to liability with 
conferral of immunity. That Congress did not wish to provide a 
polluter with a defense to CERCLA liability because of the gov-
ernment's negligence does not at all suggest that it intended to 
exempt the government from all liability of its proportionate 
share. Indeed, it suggests just the reverse .... CERCLA throws 
a broad liability net and relies on the courts' sense of equity to 
apportion the costs of cleanup. Consistent with this scheme it 
would be surprising if Congress exempted an otherwise respon-
sible person from all liability-whether that person is a govern-
mental body or a private polluter -merely because some other 
person was also responsible. That is a common situation contem-
plated by CERCLA, and the rejection of the Helms Amendment 
does nothing to support the argument that the government should 
be immune from liability when it negligently causes harm to the 
environment during a remediation process. (In any event, the 
argument based on the rejection of the Helms Amendment, which 
was a proposed amendment to the original CERCLA statute, 
loses all force in light of SARA, which added § 9607(d)(2».396 
Additionally, the court in Iron Mountain Mines rejected the argu-
ment that Congress in CERCLA has not clearly waived sovereign 
immunity for causes of action against the government for governmen-
tal activities in a remedial or regulatory capacity and that "waivers 
of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed," asserting that 
CERCLA's '''cascade of plain language' emphatically waiv[es] sover-
eign immunity .... "397 
The court also noted that absolute immunity for governmental 
remediators "must overcome the hurdle ... posed by § 9607(d)(I) and 
its provision for liability by such persons when costs or damages 
result from their negligence."39s The court took the position that sec-
tions 107(d)(I) and 107(d)(2) provide for governmental liability for 
negligence or gross negligence, not under state tort law (the interpre-
tation adopted by courts recognizing that governmental cleanup ac-
tivities are immune from liability under section 107.)399 
In conclusion, the court in Iron Mountain Mines held that there is 
no governmental "regulatory" or "remedial" activities exception to 
CERCLA liability; and that CERCLA's "general rule [is] that gov-
ernmental entities are to be liable to the same extent as private 
parties" and that section 107(a) "does not differentiate between gov-
396 [d. 
397 See id. at 1447 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 11 (1989». 
398 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1447 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
399 See id. 
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ernmental and private entities in describing the four classes of re-
sponsible persons .... "400 
These reasons, set forth in Iron Mountain Mines, for interpreting 
CERCLA as not immunizing governmental remedial cleanup activi-
ties from liability under section 107 are convincing. As noted earlier 
in this Article, CERCLA clearly waives federal, state and local gov-
ernment sovereign immunity so as to make governmental entities 
liable under CERCLA to the same extent as private entities.401 Just 
as CERCLA's waiver leaves no room for sovereign immunity from 
CERCLA liability for governmental regulatory activities,402 CER-
CLA's waiver also leaves no room for sovereign immunity for govern-
mental remedial cleanup activities. 
The court in Iron Mountain Mines did not address the question of 
whether governmental remedial cleanup activities by themselves are 
sufficient to make the government liable under section 107 as an 
operator or arranger,403 but other courts have held that governmental 
400 See id. at 1448. The court noted that section 107(d)(1) (which applies to any "person") also 
does not "provide for special treatment for governmental entities," although it observed that 
"Section 107(d)(2) provides additional protection to state or local governments who respond to 
emergencies caused by releases from facilities owned by others .... " See id. 
401 See supra notes 24-85 and accompanying text. 
402 See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 838-42 (3d Cir. 1994) (en 
banc). 
403 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1452 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
However, the court in Iron Mountain Mines held that counterclaims-which alleged that the 
state of California (in cooperation with the federal government) actively participated in operat-
ing several dams that aggravated the pollution of streams and rivers caused by acid drainage 
from the defendants' mine-were sufficient to state a claim under section 107 and to survive a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. The court reasoned that these allegations pled 
facts indicating that the state of California "is involved in the day-to-day control of the dams 
and has authority to determine the timing and quantity of releases from the dams ... activity 
that allegedly determines the concentration of sulfuric acid in the water of the Sacramento 
River. Id. This is just the type of control that is required to create 'operator' liability." See id. 
On the other hand, the Iron Mountain Mines court held that the counterclaims allegation-that 
the state was liable under section 107 as an "arranger" of disposal at the dam-were deficient, 
because they had "not adequately alleged that the State owned or possessed the hazardous 
waste in question." See id. This "arranger" liability claim consequently was dismissed without 
prejudice for failure to state a claim. See id. Furthermore, the court in Iron Mountain Mines, 
without prejudice dismissed (for failure to state a claim) separate counterclaims alleging that 
the United States was liable under section 107 as an operator of the defendant's mine and as an 
arranger of disposal of wastes at the mine during World War II, because the United States' 
involvement with the mine during this period was viewed as essentially that of a purchaser of 
a product which encouraged its production. See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 
F. Supp. 1432, 1449-51 (E.D. Cal. 1995); see also supra note 359. These two rulings on the 
counterclaims in Iron Mountain Mines might be interpreted as indicating that the court would 
not hold a governmental entity liable under section 107 solely for governmental actions in a 
regulatory or cleanup capacity that do not involve governmental day-to-day control of the 
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remedial cleanup activities, even when conducted improperly so as to 
release additional hazardous substances, are not sufficient by them-
selves to make the entity liable under section 107 either as an operator 
of a facility404 or as an arranger for disposal of hazardous substances 
at a facility.405 
Governmental cleanup activities at a site, even if conducted negli-
gently in a way that released additional hazardous substances, have 
been held insufficient for operator liability, on the grounds that a 
governmental entity's "regulatory response to severe environmental 
problems left by others does not constitute the possession or control 
necessary for [it] to become an operator."406 Such governmental 
cleanup activities should not be held to be within actual control defini-
tions407 of operator of a facility under section 107, because governmen-
tal cleanup of wastes disposed of by another person at a facility owned 
by another person does not involve actual control over day-to-day 
business operations of the facility408 or actual control over the activi-
ties at the facility that caused the pollution being cleaned up by the 
government.409 However, a governmental entity may be held liable as 
an operator of a facility under these actual control tests if its activities 
exceed physical handling and removal of hazardous substances at a 
facility, or go beyond remediation of contaminated soil, water, and 
groundwater, and other response41O actions under CERCLA, and ex-
tend to governmental supervision and management of the facility's 
employees, finances, and business operations of the facility on a day-
to-day basis.41l Governmental cleanup activities at a facility also 
facility's business operations and activities, or of hazardous substances disposal or releases at 
the facility. 
404 In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 790 F. Supp. 94, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1992), a/I'd, 980 F.2d 724 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Stilloe v. Almy Bros., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 731, 736 (N.D.N.Y 1992); United States v. 
Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. 725, 731 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
406 See CPC Int'l v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 577--80 (W.D. Mich. 1991), a/I'd in 
part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom.; United States v. Cordova Chern. Co., 59 F.3d 
584 (6th Cir. 1995); Stilloe v. Almy Bros., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 95, 99 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), motion 
to dismiss granted, 782 F. Supp. 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). 
406 See CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 578; see also Stilloe, 782 F. Supp. at 736 ("Even if ... DEC's 
physical handling of the hazardous waste during ... cleanup activities resulted in damage to 
plaintiff, this activity, without more, does not convert DEC into an operator within the meaning 
of CERCLA"). 
4117 See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text. 
408 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
409 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
410 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-{25) (1994) (defining "response," "removal," and "remedial ac-
tion"). 
411 Cf United States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that "there is no 
allegation that DREC went beyond this governmental supervision and directly managed Caro-
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should be excluded from the authority to control test412 for operator 
liability because governmental cleanup activities under CERCLA or 
other statutory authority at a facility owned by another person, in 
response to previous disposal of hazardous substances by other per-
sons, should not be found to give a governmental entity the authority 
or power to control the operations or decisions at the facility involving 
the disposal of hazardous substances. 
Governmental cleanup activities at another person's facility have 
been held insufficient for arranger liability under section 107(a)(3) on 
the grounds that the nexus that is required between the allegedly 
responsible arranger and the owner of the hazardous substances (in 
order to satisfy section 107(a)(3)'s "owned or possessed" element)413 is 
not present "when the only connection between the entity allegedly 
responsible for the damage and the hazardous waste itself is the fact 
that the party in question was attempting to remediate the hazardous 
waste problems at the site."414 In essence, a governmental entity is 
held not liable as an arranger under section 107(a)(3), solely as a result 
of its cleanup of hazardous substances disposed of by another person 
at a facility owned by another person, because such governmental 
cleanup activities alone do not satisfy section 107(a)(3)'s requirement 
that an arranger must have "owned or possessed" the hazardous 
substances which that person arranged to be disposed of or treated.416 
This is a sound interpretation of section 107(a)(3)of CERCLA. 
CERCLA's purposes are not furthered by a holding that a govern-
mental entity's cleanup activities at a facility are sufficient by them-
selves to make the entity liable under section 107, either as an opera-
lawn's employees or finances at the Fort Lawn site"). However, even if state or local govern-
mental entity has undertaken such actual control of a facility, it may be exempt from "owner or 
operator" liability if it "acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax 
delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily ac-
quires title by virtue of its function as sovereign." See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D). 
412 See BUpra note 189 and accompanying text. 
418 See BUpra note 198 and accompanying text. 
414 Stilloe v. Almy Bros., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 95, 99 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), motion to dismiss 
granted, 782 F. Supp. 731 (N.D. N.Y. 1992). The court in Stilloe also held that a claim that a 
governmental entity was liable as an "arranger" under section 107(a)(3) as a result of govern-
mental cleanup activities, was deficient because the plaintiff had not alleged in his complaint 
that the governmental entity "contracted or otherwise arranged for the disposal of hazardous 
waste .... " See id. at 99. 
416 See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 577 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd in 
part and rev'd in part on other grounds BUb nom; United States v. Cordova Chern. Co., 59 F.3d 
584 (6th Cir. 1995). The court held that for liability to attach under section 107(a)(3) ''to a party 
without actual ownership or possession of a facility, a nexus must exist in which a party has 
assumed responsibility for or control over the disposition of hazardous waste," and that the 
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tor of the facility or as an arranger for disposal or treatment of 
hazardous substances at the facility. Holding a governmental entity 
liable under section 107, solely on the basis of its cleanup of hazardous 
substances disposed of by other persons at a facility not owned by 
that entity, will not further CERCLA's "central purpose . . . to 
achieve cleanup,"416 because such potential liability may deter or "dis-
courage the government from making cleanup efforts"417 or at least 
will decrease the amount of funds available to governments to under-
take cleanups under CERCLA and other statutory authority (by the 
amount by which a governmental entity is held liable under section 
107 for its cleanup activities). In addition, an interpretation of CER-
CLA that permits governmental entities to be held liable as a result 
of their cleanup activities would contradict CERCLA's "'essential 
purpose of making those responsible for problems caused by the 
disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for 
remedying the harmful conditions they created,"'418 as well as "Con-
gress' intent [in CERCLA] to ensure that those who benefit finan-
cially from a commercial activity should internalize the health and 
environmental costs of that activity into the costs of doing busi-
ness,"419 because such liability might allow persons who contributed 
to hazardous waste problems to transfer some of their liability to 
governmental entities that responded to these problems. 
When governmental cleanup activities were in accordance with the 
National Contingency Plan or at the direction of an on-scene coordi-
nator and were in response to an incident creating a danger to public 
health or welfare or the environment, a holding that such cleanup 
activities are not sufficient for operator or arranger liability will sim-
ply mirror the exemption from liability provided by section 107(d)(1)420 
of CERCLA.421 Section 107(d)(1), however, would still have inde-
Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) was not liable as an arranger under 
section 107(a)(3) for its allegedly improper cleanup activities at a site owned by another person 
because "a nexus of control or possession is lacking in the case against MDNR because MDNR's 
involvement in cleanup activities at the site was only regulatory. MDNR merely worked to 
eliminate or reduce severe environmental problems that had been left by prior owners and 
threatened public health and the environment." [d. 
416 United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1445-46 (E.D. Cal 1995). 
417 FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
418 [d. (quoting Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d 
Cir. 1993»; 
419 United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp 1239, 1245 (D. Md. 1991), motions to dismiss denied, 
774 F. Supp. 376 (D. Md. 1991). 
42042 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (1994). 
421 See supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text. 
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pendent utility, because its exemption applies to any "person" (not 
just governmental entities).422 Furthermore, a holding that state or 
local government cleanup actions in response to a hazardous sub-
stance emergency at another person's facility are not sufficient for 
operator or arranger liability under section 107, will exempt a state 
or local government from liability under section 107 to the same 
extent as section 107(d)(2)423 of CERCLA,424 but will not conflict with 
or contradict section 107(d)(2) to any extent. 
The author has found no indication in CERCLA's legislative history 
that Congress intended that section 107(d) was to be interpreted as 
prohibiting the courts from interpreting operator and arranger under 
section 107 to exclude governmental cleanup activities not exempted 
from liability under section 107(d)(1) and 107(d)(2). Congress simply 
may have enacted section 107(d) to make sure that the cleanup activi-
ties encompassed by those sections would not be subjected to CER-
CLA liability, leaving it to courts to determine what other cleanup 
activities should be exempted from CERCLA liability.425 
V. DENIAL OF RECOVERY OF GoVERNMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE NCP 
A holding that even governmental cleanup activities that are incon-
sistent with the NCp426 are not sufficient for operator or arranger 
liability under section 107 does not leave PRPs without a remedy in 
such situations. In an action under section 107(a)(4)(A)427 by a state or 
the federal government to recover governmental response costs, the 
government is not entitled to recover response costs that are incon-
sistent with the NCP.428 However, a defendant in an action under 
section 107(a)(4) has the burden of establishing that governmental 
response costs for which the federal or a state government seeks 
422 42 U .S.C. § 9607(d)(7). 
423 [d. § 9607(d)(2). 
424 See 8Upra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. 
425 Cf, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,695-98 
(1995) (Congress' explicit prohibition of certain modifications of wildlife habitat in section 7(a)(2), 
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) did not preclude interpretation of ''takings'' prohibition 
in section 9(a)(l) of ESA, as prohibiting the same, and other, modifications of wildlife habitat). 
426 See 8Upra note 91 and accompanying text. 
42742 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
428 See United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chern., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
A claim by a defendant in an action under section 107(a)(4) that the government's cleanup 
activities were inconsistent with the NCP is not a defense to PRP liability, but rather only 
affects the amount of response costs recoverable by the government in the action. See Cadillac 
Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chern. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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recovery were not consistent with the NCP.429 State and federal gov-
ernment response costs are presumed to be consistent with the NCP 
unless the defendant in an action under section 107(a)(4) shows that 
the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in choosing the particular 
response actions undertaken at the facility or site.430 A defendant has 
a difficult burden in meeting this arbitrary and capricious standard.431 
The NCP does not impose a duty upon EPA to mitigate damages or 
to minimize cleanup costs,432 and makes cost-effectiveness a criterion 
in selection of response actions only when EPA is selecting a perma-
nent remedy from among alternatives.433 However, if the government 
engages in response actions at a facility that are inconsistent with the 
NCP and further contaminates a site, necessitating additional re-
sponse actions to clean up such contamination, the defendants in an 
action brought by the government under section 107(a)(4)(A) to re-
cover its response costs should not be liable for the costs of these 
additional response actions to correct the problems caused by the 
earlier inconsistent response actions (or for the costs of the earlier 
inconsistent response actions).434 
Further, if governmental cleanup activities (even those consistent 
with the NCP) cause damages to the property of a PRP or increase 
the cost of governmental cleanup activities for which a PRP is liable, 
the injured PRP may have a claim (or a counterclaim, if the PRP is 
being sued under section 107) under section 107(d)(1)435 or section 
107(d)(2)436 for costs or damages as the result of negligence or gross 
negligence by the government, as well as recoupment counterclaims 
for damages against a governmental plaintiff who has sued the defen-
dant under section 107.437 
429 See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986). 
430 See id. at 748; United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1992). 
431 This burden is much more difficult than defeating the recovery sought by a private party 
under section 107(a)(4)(B). A private party who has brought an action under section 107(a)(4)(B) 
to recover its response costs has the burden of showing that its response actions were both 
consistent with the NCP and necessary. See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., 840 F.2d at 965. However, 
the NCP only requires private parties to be in "substantial compliance" with specified provisions 
of the NCP. See Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 823 F. Supp. 1218, 1239-40 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
432 See Atlas Minerals, 797 F. Supp. at 417 n.13. 
433 See United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 786 F. Supp. 152, 162 (D.R.I. 1992). Cost-ef-
fectiveness is not a relevant criteria when EPA selects a removal action under CERCLA. See 
id. at 161. 
434 See Atlas Minerals, 797 F. Supp. at 422. 
436 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (1994); see supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text. 
436 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2); see supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. 
437 See infra notes 438-64 and accompanying text. 
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VI. RECOUPMENT COUNTERCLAIMS 
As discussed later in this section, several courts have held that 
when a governmental entity sues to recover response costs under 
CERCLA it waives its sovereign immunity as to all [recoupment] 
counterclaims arising under CERCLA or state law involving the 
same "transaction or occurrence" as the government's CERCLA 
claim, so long as the dollar amount of the counterclaims does not 
exceed the government's recovery for response costs.438 
Some of these courts have allowed a defendant in a governmental 
cost-recovery action under section 107 to bring a recoupment coun-
terclaim seeking recovery of the costs of negligent or otherwise im-
proper governmental response costs, or of damages for injuries, de-
struction, or taking of defendant's property resulting from the 
government's response actions, which if successful will reduce the 
amount that a governmental plaintiff recovers in the action. 
Recoupment is a common law, equitable doctrine that permits a 
defendant to assert a defensive claim against a plaintiff, arising from 
the same contract or transaction as the plaintiff's claim, to reduce the 
amount of the damages recoverable by plaintiff.439 Although a recoup-
ment counterclaim is the common-law precursor to the modern com-
pulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in federal courts recoupment counterclaims have survived 
"the codification of compulsory counterclaims and enjoy continuing 
vitality as a means of asserting an otherwise time-barred counter-
claim."440 
Under a theory of recoupment, a defendant in an action brought 
by the government may assert any counterclaim arising from the 
same transaction or occurrence as the government's action, even 
though the counterclaim otherwise would be barred by sovereign 
immunity or the statute of limitations were it brought as a sepa-
rate action. The claim in recoupment may not exceed the govern-
ment's recovery but may only offset it. Recoupment builds on the 
notion that the government waives sovereign immunity and the 
defense of statute of limitations when it brings suit.441 
438 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1453 (E.D. Cal. 1995) 
(citations omitted). The proper fonn for a recoupment claim by a defendant in an action under 
section 107 is to file a recoupment counterclaim or an independent action for recoupment, rather 
than asserting recoupment as an affirmative defense. United States v. Smuggler-Duran Mining 
Corp., 823 F. Supp. 873, 878 (D. Colo. 1993). 
439 See Berger v. City of North Miami, 820 F. Supp. 989, 992 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
44°Id. 
441 Iron Mountain Mines, 881 F. Supp. at 1452-63. 
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The court in United States v. Iron Mountain Mines442 (Iron Moun-
tain Mines II) reasoned that "[w]hen recoupment is invoked against 
the United States it rests on federal common law, the federal law of 
sovereign immunitY,"443 but held that "in the context of a CERCLA 
action there is no reason to extend or create a judicially implied 
[recoupment] remedy against the United States when Congress has 
expressly provided the remedy. Indeed, the possibility of conflict 
between the judicial remedy and the statutory scheme provides a 
sound reason not to imply a remedy."444 Earlier, the court in United 
States v. Iron Mountain Mines (hereinafter Iron Mountain Mines I) 
held that a defendant, in an action by state and federal governments 
under section 107 to recover response costs, cannot bring recoupment 
counterclaims based upon state or federal statutory and common law 
(other than CERCLA), because Congress has not waived governmen-
tal sovereign immunity to such claims.445 Iron Mountain Mines I ex-
pressed concern that allowing recoupment counterclaims based upon 
state law in actions brought under section 107 could result in impo-
sition of liability upon the federal government or a state under strict 
liability or some other standard, whereas CERCLA reviews govern-
mental actions under a negligence standard,446 a gross negligence 
standard,447 or an arbitrary and capricious standard.448 The court 
added: 
Moreover, there is no compelling need for application of the re-
coupment doctrine in the context of a government cost recovery 
action under CERCLA because CERCLA itself permits the de-
fendant in a suit by the government to seek contribution and 
make claims against the government. Furthermore, to permit a 
claim made under another legal regime, brought by way of re-
coupment, simply because the government brought suit under 
CERCLA, could well undermine CERCLA's scheme of allocating 
442 United States v. Iron Mountian Mines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter 
Iron Mountain Mines Il]. 
443 Id. at 677. 
444 Id. 
445 Iron Mountain Mines, 881 F. Supp. at 1456. This court interpreted CERCLA as "expressly 
lirnit[ing] its waiver of sovereign immunity to CERCLA counterclaims." Id. See also United 
States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 275, 282--84 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (expressing 
doubt that CERCLA has waived the federal government's sovereign immunity from recoup-
ment claims, alleging that the United States caused additional contamination at a site, but 
postponing a final ruling on the recoupment issue). 
446 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (1994). 
447Id. §§ 9607(d)(2), 9613(j)(2). 
448 See Iron Mountain Mines, 881 F. Supp. at 1454. 
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cleanup costs and of setting standards for liability for government 
activities.449 
Subsequently, however, in light of the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution 
in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,450 the court in Iron Mountain Mines II 
held that recoupment claims based upon CERCLA could be brought 
against a state by a private person whom the state sued under CER-
CLA, either on the grounds that the state's filing of suit is a limited 
waiver of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity or that such a 
recoupment counterclaim falls outside the Eleventh Amendment's 
scope because a defensive recoupment counterclaim is not a "suit" 
within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.451 The court in Iron 
Mountain Mines II, however, held that a state's law of sovereign 
immunity determines whether a private person can bring a recoup-
ment claim based upon state law against a state that has sued the 
private person under CERCLA in federal court.452 
Several courts have rejected a recoupment counterclaim by a de-
fendant in a suit by the federal government under section 107 seeking 
response costs, on the ground that the defenses set forth in section 
107(b)453 are the exclusive defenses to liability for response costS.454 
These holdings can be criticized, of course, on the ground that they 
confuse a recoupment counterclaim (that may reduce the amount of 
damages for which a defendant is liable) with an affirmative defense 
that excuses a defendant from liability altogether. Courts that do 
permit a defendant to bring a recoupment counterclaim do so only if 
the following three requirements are satisfied: (1) the recoupment 
claim arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the main 
449 Id. at 1456. As discussed earlier, Iron Mountain Mines also held that governmental cleanup 
activities are not immune from liability under section 107. See supra notes 380-402 and accom-
panying text. 
460 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125-26 (1996); see supra notes 109-39 
and accompanying text. 
451 Iron Mountain Mines II, 952 F. Supp. 673, 677-78 (E.D. Cal. 1996). The court in Iron 
Mountain Mines II further reasoned that application of the Eleventh Amendment "may depend 
on whether any damages awarded would be paid out of the state's treasury," and that "under 
this test, a claim in recoupment is not a suit 'against a state' because the relief sought is merely 
responsive to and no greater than the relief sought by the state and requires no payment by 
the state from its treasury." Id. at 678. 
452 See id. at 677 n.6. 
453 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994). 
454 United States v. American Color & Chern. Corp., 858 F. Supp. 445, 453 (M.D. Pa. 1994); 
United States v. Smuggler-Durant Mining Corp., 823 F. Supp. 873, 878 (D. Colo. 1993). 
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claim; (2) the recoupment claim seeks relief of the same kind and 
nature as that sought by the main claim; and (3) the claim is defensive 
in nature and does not seek affirmative relief.455 
Some courts follow a liberal interpretation of the "same transac-
tion" and "same relief" requirements for recoupment claims in a gov-
ernmental action to recover response costs, finding that a plaintiff's 
claim for response costs arises out of the plaintiff's response actions 
to clean up the site.455 Under this approach, a defendant, in an action 
brought by a state government to recover response costs has been 
permitted to bring a recoupment counterclaim against the state that 
sought to reduce the plaintiff's recovery by the amount of response 
costs attributable to the state's alleged failure to adequately conduct 
and supervise cleanup operations.457 This approach also has permitted 
a defendant, in an action brought by the United States to recover 
response costs to bring a recoupment counterclaim that sought to 
reduce the plaintiff's recovery by the amount of damages allegedly 
caused to defendant's property by the plaintiff while performing re-
sponse actions.458 Another court, following a similar approach, has held 
that a plaintiff's claim, in an action by the government to recover 
response costs, arises both out of the plaintiff's cleanup of the site and 
out of the contamination of the site that was cleaned up; and that the 
defendant in the action therefore was permitted to file a recoupment 
counterclaim for the amount of damages allegedly caused by the 
plaintiff's cleanup activities in taking property of the defendant and 
456 See United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990), afl'd in part and 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992); see also American Color & Chern. 
Corp., 858 F. Supp. at 451; United States v. MN Santa Clara I, 819 F. Supp. 507, 513 (D.S.C. 
1993); Berger v. City of North Miami, 820 F. Supp. 989, 992 (E.D. Va. 1993); United States v. 
Atlas Minerals & Chern., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1992). Several courts have 
interpreted this first requirement as mandating a recoupment counterclaim to be compulsory 
in nature. United States v. Montrose Chern. Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1485, 1491 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1992); 
United States v. Nicolet, No. Civ. A. 85-3060, 1986 WL 15017, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1986). This first 
requirement also was interpreted by the court in MIV Santa Clara I as requiring a recoupment 
counterclaim to be compulsory under Rule 13(a) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
and therefore to be mature as of the date the answer is filed. See MIV Santa Clara I, 819 F. 
Supp. at 514. 
466 See United States v. Amtreco, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1576, 1581-83 (M.D. Ga. 1992); United 
States v. Shaner, No. Civ. A. 85-1372, 1992 WL 154652, *11 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1992); United States 
v. Moore, 703 F. Supp. 455,459 (E.D. Va. 1988); Nicolet, 1986 WL 15017, at *7. 
457 See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 910-11 (D.N.H. 1985). The court in Mottolo, 
however, did not allow a recoupment counterclaim to be brought against the state that sought 
to recover from the state cleanup costs allegedly incurred by the federal government as a result 
of the state's improper cleanup activities. Id. at 911. 
458 See Amtreco, Inc., 790 F. Supp. at 1581-83. 
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in selling to the defendant allegedly defective equipment that caused 
part of the contamination cleaned up by the plaintiff.469 
As discussed below, a narrower interpretation of the "same trans-
action" requirement for recoupment claims in actions is applied by a 
state or the federal government to recover response costs. Under this 
narrower approach, a plaintiff's claim in an action under section 107 
is held to arise out of the pollution of the site by the release or disposal 
of hazardous substances that the plaintiff cleaned up, resulting in the 
court denying a recoupment counterclaim that sought to reduce the 
plaintiff's recovery by the cost of response actions that allegedly were 
performed negligently or improperly (further contaminating the site), 
on the grounds that the counterclaim did not arise out of the same 
transaction as the plaintiff's claim.460 Other courts following this re-
strictive approach to the "same transaction" requirement have barred 
a defendant, in an action under section 107 by a state or the federal 
government to recover response costs from bringing a recoupment 
counterclaim based upon indemnification provisions in the defendant's 
lease for the facility that released hazardous substances,461 or based 
upon a contract to assist in the development of the site.462 
One court, although not deciding whether a defendant, in a suit 
brought by the United States under section 107 to recover response 
costs, was permitted to bring a recoupment counterclaim to reduce 
the government's recovery by the amount of the costs incurred by the 
government in responding to earlier allegedly improper EPA re-
sponse actions, has noted that a claim under section 107(a)(4)(A) that 
response costs are inconsistent with the NCP is not necessarily re-
dundant with a recoupment claim alleging that inconsistent response 
actions caused additional cleanup costs.463 The court indicated that it 
was inclined to take the view that a defendant in a governmental cost 
recovery action under section 107(a)(4)(A), has no liability for the 
costs incurred by the government to correct earlier response costs 
that were inconsistent with the NCP and therefore to dismiss the 
defendant's recoupment claims as redundant, but the court deferred 
469 See Moore, 703 F. Supp. at 459. 
460 See American Color & Chern. Corp., 858 F. Supp. 445, 453 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Hardage, 740 
F. Supp. at 1519, aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992). 
461 See Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 155 B.R. 890, 903, 910-12 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
462 See Berger v. City of North Miami, 820 F. Supp. 989, 993-94 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
4413 See United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chern., Inc. 797 F. Supp. 411, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
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ruling on the recoupment claims because the issue had not been fully 
briefed or argued.464 
Although recoupment counterclaims often may be redundant with 
section 107(a)(4)(A),s provision denying government recovery of re-
sponse costs inconsistent with the NCP, or with section 107(d)'s pres-
ervation of governmental liability for negligence and gross negligence 
in cleanup activities, there may be situations where a recoupment 
counterclaim based upon state law may give a defendant a viable 
cause of action against a governmental entity when CERCLA does 
not do so. However, as discussed earlier in this section, some federal 
courts permit defendants in an action under section 107 to bring only 
counterclaims based upon CERCLA, effectively precluding recoup-
ment counterclaims, and other federal courts interpret the "same 
transaction" requirement for recoupment counterclaims so narrowly 
as to preclude a defendant's recoupment counterclaims. Only a few 
federal courts have permitted a defendant to bring a recoupment 
counterclaim based upon state law in a governmental action under 
section 107 to recover response costs. Whether or not recoupment 
counterclaims can be utilized by defendants in actions under section 
107(a)(4)(A) to reduce their liability remains to be seen. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Federal, state, and local governments generally should be liable 
under sections 107 and 113(0 of CERCLA to the same extent and 
under the same general standards as other persons (including corpo-
rations and individual corporate employees). When hazardous sub-
stances are released from a facility owned by a governmental entity 
(or which was owned by a governmental entity when hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of at the facility), the governmental entity 
should be subject to liability as an owner or operator of the facility 
under section 107 or section 113(0 of CERCLA to the same extent as 
any other person. When a governmental entity engages in an activity 
or operates a facility that generates a hazardous substance and the 
entity arranges for the substance to be disposed of or treated by 
another person's facility, the governmental entity should be subject 
to liability under section 107 or 113(0 of CERCLA to the same extent 
as any other person. 
464 See id. 
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However, CERCLA specifically provides exemptions from liability 
under sections 107 and 113(f) when a state or local government invol-
untarily acquires ownership or control of a facility in its sovereign 
function,465 when a government acquires an interest in real estate to 
conduct a CERCLA remedial action,465 and when a governmental 
entity engages in certain response and cleanup actions.467 In addition, 
state governments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment of 
the United States Constitution from being sued by private persons 
under sections 107 and 113(f) in federal courts. Furthermore, a gov-
ernmental entity should not be held liable under either section 107 or 
section 113(f), either as an operator of a facility or as an arranger of 
disposal of hazardous substances at a facility, solely on the basis of 
governmental regulation of waste disposal or other activities by other 
persons at another person's facility, governmental purchase of a prod-
uct or materials produced at another person's facility, or governmen-
tal cleanup or response to the release or threatened release of haz-
ardous substances disposed of by other persons at another person's 
facility. 
466 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1994). 
466 [d. § 9604G)(3). 
467 [d. § 9607(d)(l). See supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text. 
